Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
ANASOF currently operate at a high tempo, impacting the campaign far more than their
numbers would suggest. However, for many of their operations they are dependent upon ISAF
air transport, and in particular, helicopter lift. The AAF is not projected to be able to provide the
ANASOF with enough helicopter mobility to make up for the departure of most ISAF forces in
2014. As ISAF helicopter transport becomes less available, ANASOF will have to travel more
by ground. As ground transportation is difficult in many areas of Afghanistan, and is inherently
slower than air transport, this will result in diminished ANASOF effectiveness.
Equipping and Enablers
CSTC-A procured and delivered a high percentage of ANA-required equipment to Afghan
depots during the reporting period. Of the three main categories of equipment required by the
ANA (shoot, move, and communicate), CSTC-A delivered 114 percent of “shoot” equipment,
91.2 percent of “move” equipment, and 99.5 percent of “communicate” equipment.
However, delivering equipment to the national and regional depots does not mean that this
equipment has reached personnel in the field. There is a shortfall in distribution between the
regional depots and fielded units. Equipment shortages were reported in several key areas to
include: medical, maintenance, mortars, night vision goggles, communications, CIED/ electronic
countermeasure, and artillery Basic Issue Items. Shortages in CIED equipment also limit the
ANP’s ability to conduct CIED operations. Planning for logistical sustainment of operations and
supply forecasting remains a work in progress.
The ANA’s main challenge in equipping its units continues to be the delivery of equipment from
depots to the units deployed in the field. Each individual ANA unit is slated to receive
equipment that has been released from the national depots, shipped through the ANA Central
Movement Agency, and delivered to ANA Regional Logistic Support Commands (RLSC).
RLSCs subsequently issue the equipment to the field units. Some RLSCs have warehoused
equipment waiting to be issued, while nearby units in the field are forced to operate in an underequipped
state. CSTC-A has limited ability to track equipment once it is delivered to the depots,
although the equipment levels of partnered units in the field are tracked under the Commanders
Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) system. Recent visits at Kabul Airport (KAIA), for example,
identified excessive requisitioning for aircraft parts that were visibly available at the RLSC but
that were not being issued. ANA RLSCs will need continued support from advisors to improve
efficiencies and troubleshoot logistics bottlenecks.
Although NTM-A does not track most equipment that has been fielded to the kandak level,
CSTC-A conducts 100 percent annual accountability of night vision devices and quarterly
inspections of serial-numbered Class VII items such as vehicles, radios and weapons in
accordance with U.S. end-use monitoring law and regulation laws and regulations. CSTC-A
conducts routine inspections of weapons that have been transferred to the MoD and MoI to
ensure end-use compliance.
By the end of ISAF’s mission in 2014, U.S. and coalition enabler support (close air support,
medevac, direct fire, ISR) to the ANSF will be withdrawn, creating gaps which, if not addressed,
will reduce GIRoA’s ability to provide security for its populace and deter external threats. The
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