Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
11 additional events were reclassified as insider attacks for a 2007-2012 total of 99 attacks.
Additionally, there were three events that occurred in 2013, bringing the current total of insider
attacks against ISAF to 102.
Insider attacks on U.S., Afghan and coalition military personnel from January 1, 2007,
through March 31, 2013:
- Against ISAF (including U.S.): 102
- Against U.S.: 70
The number of U.S., Afghan and coalition personnel killed or wounded in insider attacks
from January 1, 2007 through March 31, 2013:
- ISAF Casualties: 144 KIA & 208 WIA
- US Casualties: 92 KIA & 134 WIA
Insider attacks occur for numerous reasons, including insurgent influences, personal grievances,
broad cultural conflicts, psychological distress and social pressures. Broad cultural insults are
reinforced by Badal a centuries-old Pashtun cultural precept that motivates Afghans to defend
their honor and seek revenge. None of the insider attacks against ISAF during the reporting
period was attributable to personal disagreements. Roughly half of the attacks in 2012 involved
some level of insurgent links, with a third of those only making contact with insurgents after
their attack. Some of the broad cultural insults that are assessed to have influenced attacks in the
past include the mishandling of religious materials, an incident in which coalition forces showed
disrespect to insurgent remains, and the release of inflammatory religious videos and cartoons.
No insider attacks against ISAF or U.S. forces were conducted by Afghan Public Protection
Force (APPF) members. When APPF guards are hired, they undergo a vetting process that
includes drug testing as well as biometrics recording.
Approximately 80 percent of total insider attacks occurred on coalition, ANSF or joint bases,
with approximately 20 percent occurring during joint patrols. The majority of attackers were
between 17 and 25 years old and of Pashtun descent. Most attacks occurred in the provinces that
contain high numbers of coalition forces and are the centers of traditional areas of insurgent
strength within the Pashtun belts. Typically, victims of insider attacks are chosen as targets of
opportunity, not on the basis of their rank or position. Some insider attacks may have been
targeting GIRoA officials but coalition force members became collateral damage or became
primary targets if their intended target was well protected or hard to access.
There was a 120 percent increase in insider attacks from 2011 to 2012, rising from 22 to 48
incidents. Additionally, 29 percent (14) of the insider attacks in 2012 were executed by more
than one person. Prior to 2012, only two attacks had been executed by more than one individual.
During the reporting period, ISAF reassessed its analysis of the motivations behind insider
attacks. Motivations fall into three broad categories: insurgent influenced, personally initiated,
and unknown. Insurgents conducting insider attacks have been able to gain access to coalition
forces through impersonation, infiltration, or by co-opting an existing member of the ANSF to
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