Human Dignity and Bioethics

96 | Alfonso Gómez-Lobo
with a host of relativistic complications and the denial of any
sharp boundaries on which to hang tradition. 1
The above claims are important to the contents of this volume because,
if true, they leave us in the position of Plato’s bad butcher:
we would have “to splinter a limb (or part, meros) into pieces” since
there would be no “natural joints (arthra)” at which to effect the
proper cut. 2 In other words, there would be no way of deciding
objectively whether very young (and very old) human beings have
inherent dignity and therefore should be respected. This would be
a purely “conventional” matter, i.e., something to be decided…by
whom? By the majority (which often means by the most powerful
and influential within that group)? By right-wing politicians? By leftwing
ideologues? This, of course, makes it extremely difficult, in my
view, “to ensure that the values we defend deserve the respect of all,”
as Professor Dennett rightly demands.
How does Professor Dennett argue for his claims? He first gives
us a picture of the “wonderful taxonomies” science has given us. He
even uses Plato’s imagery and terminology: “[Science has]…articulated
[from arthra] and largely confirmed a Tree of Life that shows why
‘creature with a backbone’ carves Nature better than ‘creature with
wings.’” And then he adds: “But the crisp, logical boundaries that science
gives us don’t include any joints where tradition demands them.
In particular, there is no moment of ensoulment to be discovered
in the breathtakingly complicated processes that ensue after sperm
meets egg and they begin producing an embryo….”
The last statement is puzzling. Surely Professor Dennett does not
speak of ensoulment in his own voice. In other parts of his text he
rejects Cartesian dualism and also seems to reject dualism altogether.
But the notion of ensoulment requires dualistic assumptions: only if
there is one substance, a body, and a different substance, a (Cartesian)
soul, does it make sense to claim that a soul comes into a body
that previously was not human and now makes it human.
If someone rejects dualism (and I think this can only be done by
means of metaphysical arguments and not by merely scientific ones)
then the natural position to adopt is a form of monism, the view
namely that we are a single integrated substance that is alive and that,
at a certain stage of maturity, will exhibit certain mental activities