Human Dignity and Bioethics

290 | Diana Schaub
included) have, by nature, the same bodily immunity as adults. There
is a fundamental human right not to have one’s body captured or
controlled by others for their ends and purposes.
In the case of the weak and immature, respect for this basic right
to life will continue to depend on the deference of the strong. In
his speeches, Lincoln deployed his relentless logic to get those who
had the upper hand to realize the momentary and fragile character
of their strength. He stressed that the only guarantee of one’s own
rights lies in the recognition of the rights of others. “As I would not
be a slave, so I would not be a master.” 6 And again, “In giving freedom
to the slave, we assure freedom to the free—honorable alike in
what we give, and what we preserve.” 7 This is a version of neighbor
love and brotherhood that is reasonable and republican in character.
It doesn’t deny the fatherhood of God, but it doesn’t draw attention
to it either.
At the risk of impiety, I will suggest that brothers can get along
pretty well when the father, whether human or divine, remains in the
background. After all, the first story of brothers in the Bible is a story
of fratricide in response to God’s favoring the gift of one brother over
the other. I’m not so certain that it helps our sense of human equality
to view matters under the aspect of eternity. As I read the Bible,
some of us will be eternally damned and others saved. We are not
equidistant from God, either here on earth or later. I’m quite certain
that Professor Meilaender is “nearer my God to thee” than I am, but
I think that we can still be equal citizens, mutually acknowledging
our individual rights and brotherly responsibilities.
*
Though one might legitimately doubt the adequacy of rights language—particularly
in light of the corruption of that language and its
contemporary links to notions of radical autonomy—it nonetheless
seems to me still the best way to approach the bioethical issues that
arise at both the beginning of life and the end of life. When life is
at its simplest, it is the right to life that should guide our reflections.
I am not arguing for a return exclusively to rights language, since I
agree that it does not reach to all bioethics questions, particularly
those that involve the highest human possibilities. So, for instance,