Human Dignity and Bioethics

358 | Martha Nussbaum
we are moving back and forth between thinking of capacities and
thinking of a flourishing life, and there is need both for sensitive
imagination and for lots of cross-checking in the theory, as when
we arrive at some political principles based upon our intuitive idea
and then see how they look. (Following Rawls here, I urge a holistic
account of justification, in which intuitions and political principles,
and alternative accounts of both, are held up and scrutinized against
our considered judgments until we reach, if we ever do, a reflective
equilibrium.)
How exactly does my view address the Stoic contention that (untrained)
capacities are all one needs to be complete? The Aristotelian
view sees capacities as worthy of respect, but as yet unfulfilled, incomplete.
They are dynamic, not static: they tend toward development
and toward exercise, or at least the opportunity for exercise. They are
preparations for something further, they demand space within which
to unfold themselves. Human beings (like other sentient beings) are
endowed with capacities for various forms of activity and striving,
but the world can interfere with their progress toward development
and functioning.
To see why these impediments are harms, despite the worth and
dignity of the capacities, let us think of two images: imprisonment
and rape. (These images were powerfully deployed by American philosopher
Roger Williams in his 17th-century defense of liberty of
conscience. 15 ) Why is unjust imprisonment bad for a good person,
given that it does not diminish the person’s worth or dignity? Even
though imprisonment does not diminish the worth of a good person,
it is still a serious harm for a person to be unfairly imprisoned, because
it deprives the person of the opportunity to exercise his or her
good capacities. These capacities are preparations for activity, and it is
necessary for a flourishing human life, a life worthy of those capacities,
that there be opportunities to use them in activity.
Once again, why is rape bad? Why do we consider it a violation
of human dignity, or even a “crime against humanity”? 16 We
have long rejected the old bad view that rape really sullies a woman’s
worth. And yet we still believe that rape is a violation of a woman’s
dignity. Why? Rape violates the bodily, mental, and emotional life
of a woman, affecting all her opportunities for development and
functioning. Rape, we might say, does not remove or even damage