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Human Dignity and Bioethics

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498 | Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M.<br />

<strong>and</strong> economic resources in his or her particular circumstances as well<br />

as the availability of a given society’s resources. The diagnosis of PCU<br />

itself, however, must never be the basis for unilaterally withholding<br />

or withdrawing care that would be rendered to others.<br />

It is undeniably true that such individuals are extremely restricted<br />

in their ability to flourish as the kinds of things that they are. They<br />

are incapable of expressing courage, or honor, or even underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

their predicaments. Thus, their capacities for inflorescent dignity are<br />

profoundly restricted. No one wishes to be in such a state. Therefore,<br />

respect for equal intrinsic dignity also ought to assure such persons<br />

the same rights as others to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining<br />

treatments that are futile, or more burdensome than beneficial.<br />

The conception of dignity presented in this essay thus also has<br />

concrete implications for underst<strong>and</strong>ing how to care for individuals<br />

suffering from post-coma unresponsiveness. This gives further evidence<br />

of the critical importance of a serious consideration of dignity<br />

in debates about pressing issues in bioethics.<br />

Conclusion<br />

In this essay, I outlined three ways the word “dignity” has been understood<br />

in the history of Western thought <strong>and</strong> explained how these<br />

three senses of dignity—the attributed, the intrinsic, <strong>and</strong> the inflorescent—are<br />

still at play in contemporary bioethical debates. I offered<br />

two arguments about why the intrinsic sense of dignity is the most<br />

foundational—the Axiological Argument <strong>and</strong> the Argument from<br />

Consistency. In so doing, I stressed the importance of the conception<br />

of natural kinds to all three senses of dignity. I then outlined several<br />

general moral norms that specify what it means to respect dignity. Finally,<br />

I applied this theory of dignity <strong>and</strong> its associated moral norms<br />

to a variety of pressing ethical questions in contemporary bioethics,<br />

showing how this conception of dignity is extraordinarily powerful<br />

in helping us to underst<strong>and</strong> how we ought to proceed in answering<br />

these questions. Space has precluded a fuller explication of this theory<br />

or a full consideration of counter-arguments. However, it seems<br />

clear that if this is what dignity means, then dignity is anything but<br />

a useless concept.

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