Human Dignity and Bioethics

Kant’s Concept of Human Dignity | 347
we can injure or dispose of trivially.* Use of such embryonic cells for
medical research—i.e., to enhance human health—may be permitted
where other uses (e.g., for purely cosmetic purposes) are not. A
new cure for cancer is one thing; an enhanced shade of lipstick is
another. One can respect the human potential of the blastocyst in
certain determinate ways, in other words, without granting it the
status of a moral person.
None of this speaks directly to the contentious question of abortion
and the moral status of the fetus more generally. But it does
permit a helpful “bracketing” of the issue of embryonic stem cell
research as such. Such considerations also suggest the wisdom of revisiting
current federal policy. According to the most recent scientific
findings, embryonic stem cells appear to have unique properties (e.g.,
with respect to longevity) that adult stem cells cannot duplicate. The
federal government could support embryonic stem cell research more
fully while preserving a sense of its ethical complexity and without
begging the question of later-term abortion. Such a stance would not
satisfy those for whom destruction of an embryo is murder. But current
federal policy (and, indeed, most of our ordinary cultural and
legal practices) does not so treat it.
In sum: human beings have dignity, for Kant, because they are
capable of acting morally. But this capacity is only realized dialectically,
through our pragmatic dealings with the world. A richer understanding
of “humanity,” informed by Kant’s moral and pragmatic
reflections, might offer fuller and politically more useful guidance
to contemporary bioethical debates than that provided by the usual
image of Kant as a rigid dualist. Kant’s conception of human dignity
draws primarily not on metaphysical abstractions but on the necessities
that inform our everyday efforts to lead an effectual and morally
decent life. As such it offers potential common ground in a field of
contest where it is often all too rare.
* This claim does not depend on an argument that is sometimes made: namely,
that nonhuman things (such as giant sequoia trees) may nonetheless have intrinsic
value. Kant’s argument preserves our sense that the special moral status of the embryo
lies in its emerging “humanity.”