Human Dignity and Bioethics

Dignity and Bioethics | 475
distinction in axiology is between intrinsic values and attributed
values. 17
Intrinsic value is the value something has of itself—the value it
has by virtue of its being the kind of thing that it is. It is valuable
independent of any valuer’s purposes, beliefs, desires, interests, or expectations.
Truly intrinsic values, according to environmental ethicist
Holmes Rolston III, “are objectively there—discovered, not generated
by the valuer.” 18
Attributed values are those conveyed by a valuer. Attributed values
depend completely on the purposes, beliefs, desires, interests, or
expectations of a valuer or group of valuers. That is why I argue that
instrumental values are a class of attributed values. An instrumental
value is one that is attributed to some entity because it serves a purpose
for a valuer. The instrumental value of the entity consists in its
serving as a means by which the valuer achieves some purpose. But
there can be non-instrumental attributed values as well. For example,
the value of humor may serve no clear instrumental purpose.
Attributed values play important roles in human life. The authority
of government, for instance, is attributed. The value of money is
attributed. The value of technology is attributed. Importantly, some
attributed values are morally flawed, such as attributing value to human
skin color or attributing too much value to the opinions of
other persons.
Intrinsic values and attributed values are asymmetrically related.
Intrinsic values, as intrinsic and objective, must be recognized by an
intelligent valuer. Recognition, of course, requires attribution, and
thus an intelligent valuer must attribute intrinsic value to whatever
does have intrinsic value in order to be correct in his or her evaluation.
It would be incorrect for the valuer to attribute no value to what
has value intrinsically. This is not to suggest that the act of evaluation
confers the value, but that the value must be attributed to whatever
has intrinsic value in order for the act of evaluation to be correct. By
contrast, the mere fact that value has been attributed to an entity
has no logical implications with respect to intrinsic value. One may
freely attribute value to things on the basis of individual preferences,
social customs, or instrumental needs. One may also recognize (i.e.,
correctly attribute value to) an entity that has intrinsic value. The
bare fact that value has been attributed does not allow us to conclude