Human Dignity and Bioethics

9
Human Dignity and
Public Discourse
Richard John Neuhaus
Dr. Adam Schulman’s thoughtful overview (in the introduction
to this volume) of the problems posed by bioethics and human
dignity begins with a succinct description of what might be called the
state of the question. His words bear repeating:
Human dignity —is it a useful concept in bioethics, one that
sheds important light on the whole range of bioethical issues,
from embryo research and assisted reproduction, to biomedical
enhancement, to care of the disabled and the dying? Or
is it, on the contrary, a useless concept—at best a vague substitute
for other, more precise notions, at worst a mere slogan
that camouflages unconvincing arguments and unarticulated
biases?
To begin the discussion by reference to what is “useful” or “useless”
does not necessarily imply a thoroughgoing utilitarian calculus, but
it does invite the question, Useful or useless to what end? The statement
of the state of the question says that “useful” means that it sheds
important light on various bioethical issues, while “useless” means
that it is less useful than “more precise notions” or, worse, that it is
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