Human Dignity and Bioethics

472 | Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M.
human excellence and took the meaning of dignity to depend solely
upon the inter-subjective judgments of the market. In the Leviathan
he writes:
The Value or worth of a man, is, as of other things, his price;
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his
Power; and therefore it is not absolute; but a thing dependent
on the need and judgment of another…. The publique worth
of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Commonwealth,
is that which men commonly call dignity. 7
Hobbes writes clearly and bluntly. Dignity is the value one has to the
Commonwealth regardless of whether one actually merits this based
on one’s true excellence as a human being or on one’s nature as a human
being.
Kant never explicitly cites Hobbes, but in presenting yet a third
view of dignity, he seems to be writing in direct reaction to Hobbes.
The Kantian view of dignity (Würde) continues to exert a powerful
influence to the present day. Kant wrote,
The respect I bear others or which another can claim from
me (osservantia aliis praestanda) is the acknowledgement of
the dignity (dignitas) of another man, i.e., a worth which
has no price, no equivalent for which the object of valuation
(aestimii) could be exchanged. 8
Kant connected dignity with his idea that human beings should never
be treated as pure instruments of another’s will. In the Grundlagen,
he writes, “…[T]hat which constitutes the condition under which
alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative
worth, i.e., a price, but has intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity.” 9 More simply,
he states elsewhere, “Humanity itself is a dignity.” 10
Thus, the Kantian view of dignity is neither based on one’s value
to others, nor on the esteem they ought to show based on one’s degree
of human excellence, but rather on one’s humanity itself. 11 The Kantian
view of dignity is powerful, influential, and substantially different
from the notions that preceded it. The Kantian notion of Würde
may be one of his greatest contributions to moral philosophy.