Human Dignity and Bioethics

474 | Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M.
Stoic use of the word, while it sometimes borders on an attributed
sense, is generally an inflorescent sense of dignity.
These conceptions of human dignity are by no means mutually
exclusive. Attributed, intrinsic, and inflorescent conceptions of dignity
are often at play in the same situation. Yet each has been taken as
the central basis for particular moral claims in bioethics.
Does it matter which of these senses of dignity one invokes in
ethical discourse? The short answer would seem to be “yes.” At the
very least it seems important to keep these senses straight. For example,
those who claim that death with dignity requires that euthanasia
be permissible seem to be using the word “dignity” in an attributed
sense, 13 while those who claim that euthanasia is a direct offense
against human dignity appear to be using the word in an intrinsic
sense. 14 Still others who oppose euthanasia appear to argue from an
inflorescent sense of dignity, suggesting that the practice represents
less than the most noble and excellent response a human being can
make in the face of death. 15 Merely noticing these distinctions can
help us clarify arguments and understand points of disagreement.
But more than this, is there anything that can be said about the
relationship between these senses of dignity? Is there an order or
moral priority? If there is a conflict between moral claims based on
differing senses of dignity, does one count more than the other?
I will argue that the intrinsic notion of dignity is foundational
from a moral point of view. I will advance two arguments to support
this claim. I call these the Axiological Argument and the Argument
from Consistency.
The Axiological Argument
The axiological argument depends on the theory of value or axiology.
16 By understanding what values are, how values get into the
world, what sorts of values there are, and how they are related, it
will be argued that one can arrive at the conclusion that the intrinsic
sense of dignity is the fundamental sense.
Classically, axiology distinguishes between intrinsic and instrumental
values. Instrumental values, however, are best characterized
as a subclass of attributed values. I have argued that the primary