10.05.2015 Views

Human Dignity and Bioethics

Human Dignity and Bioethics

Human Dignity and Bioethics

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Kant’s Concept of <strong>Human</strong> <strong>Dignity</strong> | 335<br />

fungibility of human goods. If something has intrinsic worth, or dignity,<br />

then not all values are homogenous. Hobbes had infamously insisted<br />

that “a man’s worth” is the same as his “price,” or the “amount<br />

that would be paid for the use of his power.” 3 Kant’s concept of human<br />

dignity is a direct rejoinder to that claim.<br />

The ultimate basis of that rejoinder is what Kant calls the categorical<br />

imperative—the implicit moral comm<strong>and</strong> to which the voice<br />

of conscience, in his view, testifies. According to the first <strong>and</strong> most<br />

basic version of that imperative, one should act “only according to<br />

those maxims [or rules of action] that one could at the same time<br />

will to be a universal law.” This version of the imperative is often<br />

criticized—first <strong>and</strong> most famously by Hegel—for its empty formalism,<br />

<strong>and</strong> I will not pause here to consider it. Instead, it will be more<br />

fruitful to move to a second version, which comm<strong>and</strong>s: So act that<br />

you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any<br />

other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. 4 Kant<br />

derives this second version from the fact that willing requires an end,<br />

<strong>and</strong> in the case of moral willing, an absolute end, or end in itself.<br />

Unlike ends that are “to be acquired by our action,” <strong>and</strong> are thus<br />

“conditional” in value—either on our desires or on the contingencies<br />

of nature—an end in itself has objective value, or “dignity.” Kant had<br />

earlier claimed that the only thing “good without limitation” that is<br />

possible to think is a good will. But a good will must have some objective<br />

end if it is not to be utterly empty. If morality is to be possible<br />

at all—if a “good will” is to have an objective end—then good will<br />

itself, or the rationality that makes it possible, is the only c<strong>and</strong>idate<br />

that can fill the bill.<br />

Such are the considerations behind the following exclamation on<br />

Kant’s part:<br />

Now I say that the human being <strong>and</strong> in general every rational<br />

being exists not merely as a means to be used by this or<br />

that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions…<br />

always be regarded at the same time as an end. 5<br />

The idea of humanity as an “objective end” refers not to a goal to be<br />

achieved by our action (as in the usual meaning of an “end”) but to<br />

an absolute limit that restricts our other ends <strong>and</strong> maxims, <strong>and</strong> the

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!