Human Dignity and Bioethics

The Argument from Consistency
Dignity and Bioethics | 479
The argument from consistency is an alternative means of reaching
the conclusion that intrinsic dignity is the primary moral sense of
dignity. The argument is simple in its form. Consistency is at least
a necessary condition of a valid moral argument, even if one would
quickly add that consistency is not sufficient. 21 In discussions about
its fundamental moral meaning, the word “dignity” can be defined
as the value or worth that a human being has either: (a) in terms of
some property that some entities have and some do not, or (b) in
terms of simply being human.* But I will show that defining the fundamental
moral meaning of dignity as the value certain entities have
by virtue of their possession of any particular candidate property
leads to gross inconsistencies in our universally shared, settled moral
positions if applied to all human beings. Therefore, one is led to the
alternative: that dignity, in its fundamental moral sense, is defined in
terms of simply being human—i.e., as an intrinsic value. This kind
of argument depends on the exhaustiveness of the list of candidate
properties and is not decisive. But at least it puts the burden of proof
on those who oppose assigning moral priority to the intrinsic sense
of dignity to come up with an alternative property (such as age, size,
strength, brainwaves, or skin color) to define what gives an entity the
fundamental worth or value we call dignity.
What Sorts of Candidate Human Properties Might Be
Proposed?
First, some have argued that human dignity, in its most fundamental
moral sense, depends upon the amount of pleasure and pain in a
human life. Hedonism certainly has its adherents, whether egoistic
or utilitarian. But even hedonists might not want to promote the
pleasure/pain calculus as a theory of human dignity. Certainly, most
of us are able to tell stories about the extraordinary lessons in human
dignity we have learned from persons whose lives have been racked
* There is a third logical possibility that I will not discuss, although some nihilists
accept it—namely, that human beings have no dignity.