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1898 - Coalmininghistorypa.org

1898 - Coalmininghistorypa.org

1898 - Coalmininghistorypa.org

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238 REPORT OP THE BUREAU OF MINES. Off. Doe.I oier, it seems, had been in the liabit of tiring- any holes left unfiredby the tunnel men, during the day shift. That morning there hadbeen a toj> hole left untired. The contractor said he had put theblasting battery in the box and locked it before he left that morning,the boss laborer also having a key to the box. After the accidentthe blasting battery was found washed out near the pump room^vith the wires attached. The box in which it was kept has notbeen found yet, so that it is evident that after Reese and Flaniganleft the tunnel, the boss laborer had tired this top hole, and no doubtput powder in the hole that had been drilled to test the vein andfired that also, which broke the barrier of coal between the tunnelrmd the w^ater. This barrier had held the water back for ten oreleven hours, after the tunnel men had tired during the night, andboth Keese and Flanigan testified that when they were in the tunnellast, an hour before the water broke in, there was no sign ofwater more than usual, and even at that late hour, after receivingthe warning, had the men been taken out or prevented from firinguntil flank holes had been driven on both sides and up the pitch, theaccident could have been averted, as the coal between the tunnelai-d the old gangway would have held the water, if no blasting hadbeen done. An inquest was held on September 5th and the juryrendered a verdict that ''the accident occurred through the misleadingmaps and drafts whereby six men had lost their lives by drownirg."At this inquest, the superintendent, Thos. C. Reese, statedif) the jury that he had asked the Inspector, when he had told himc f the intention to start the tunnel, whether it Avould be necessaryto keep a drill hole in advance, and that the Inspector had said itwas not, and that all inipiiry possible had been made in regard tofinding the depth of the old Orchard workings, and from what hecould learn, the slope was not as deep as the tunnel.In regard tokeeping a drill hole ahead from the time the tunnel was started,nothing waw said about it at the time, l)ut had I been asked I certainly\N0uld have said llial it wns not necessary to keep a hole ahead untilthe Primrose vein had been reached, and had the tunnel been stopi)eda1 the Primrose vein, as I was informed it would be by the supertintendent,and by the printed notices, it is plain that there would havebeen no necessity for a di'illhole ahead, and the accident would nothave, occurred in the tunnel at least. That jtrojier intpiiry had notbeen made as to the ohl Orchard vein workings was evident from theletter received by the su]>erinlendent (.n the morning of the accident,which proved conclusively that such information was available, alsoshowing that the Orchaid vein woikings were near the level of thetunnel, if it had been sought. There were also sections in possessionof other mining engineers showing the mmv thing, from whomno information was asked.Even the company's engineei-, who migiit

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