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Collected Works of V. I. Lenin - Vol. 26 - From Marx to Mao

Collected Works of V. I. Lenin - Vol. 26 - From Marx to Mao

Collected Works of V. I. Lenin - Vol. 26 - From Marx to Mao

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THESES ON THE QUESTION OF A SEPARATE PEACE447But the question whether it is possible <strong>to</strong> carry on arevolutionary war now, immediately, must be decided exclusivelyfrom the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> whether material conditionspermit it, and <strong>of</strong> the interests <strong>of</strong> the socialist revolutionwhich has already begun.13. Summing up the arguments in favour <strong>of</strong> an immediaterevolutionary war, we have <strong>to</strong> conclude that such a policymight perhaps answer the human yearning for the beautiful,dramatic and striking, but that it would <strong>to</strong>tally disregardthe objective balance <strong>of</strong> class forces and material fac<strong>to</strong>rs atthe present stage <strong>of</strong> the socialist revolution now under way.14. There can be no doubt that our army is absolutelyFROM MARXTO MAOin no condition at the present moment, and will not be forthe next few weeks (and probably for the next few months),⋆<strong>to</strong> beat back a German <strong>of</strong>fensive successfully; firstly, owing<strong>to</strong> the extreme fatigue and exhaustion <strong>of</strong> the majority <strong>of</strong> thesoldiers, coupled with the incredible chaos in the matter <strong>of</strong>food supply, replacement <strong>of</strong> the overfatigued, etc.; secondly,owing <strong>to</strong> the utter unfitness <strong>of</strong> the horses and the consequentinevitable ruin <strong>of</strong> our artillery; and, thirdly, owing<strong>to</strong> the absolute impossibility <strong>of</strong> defending the coastlinefrom Riga <strong>to</strong> Revel, which affords the enemy a very certainchance <strong>of</strong> seizing the rest <strong>of</strong> Lifland, and then Estland, and<strong>of</strong> outflanking a large NOT part <strong>of</strong> FOR our forces, and finally, <strong>of</strong>capturing Petrograd.15. Further, there is not the slightest doubt that thepeasant majorityCOMMERCIAL<strong>of</strong> our army would at the present junctureunreservedly declare in favour <strong>of</strong> a peace with annexationsand not in favour DISTRIBUTION<strong>of</strong> an immediate revolutionary war; thesocialist reorganisation <strong>of</strong> the army, the merging <strong>of</strong> theRed Guard detachments with it, and so on, have only justbegun.With the army completely democratised, <strong>to</strong> carry on warin defiance <strong>of</strong> the wishes <strong>of</strong> the majority <strong>of</strong> the soldierswould be a reckless gamble, while <strong>to</strong> create a really staunchand ideologically stable socialist workers’ and peasants’army will, at the very least, require months and months.16. The poor peasants in Russia are capable <strong>of</strong> supportingthe socialist revolution led by the working class, but theyare not capable <strong>of</strong> agreeing <strong>to</strong> fight a serious revolutionarywar immediately, at the present juncture. To ignore the

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