atw - International Journal for Nuclear Power | 6.2023
Reaktorkonzepte und neue Entwicklungen
Reaktorkonzepte und neue Entwicklungen
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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 68 (2023) | Ausgabe 6 ı November<br />
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 30<br />
out-number them in the COPs – stipulating general<br />
criteria to be fulfilled by technology. In its 2019<br />
report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate<br />
Change took a rather optimistic view on nuclear<br />
technology [8] .<br />
At first glance, the first place to look <strong>for</strong> a hook <strong>for</strong><br />
nuclear energy in the PA is Article 10, the technology<br />
framework, which is alimented with the financial<br />
mechanism stipulated in Article 11. However, as<br />
the instruments and<br />
bodies of this framework<br />
and mechanism<br />
evolved, their criteria<br />
became practically<br />
hostile to nuclear technology.<br />
In addition to<br />
national regulatory<br />
prerogatives, activities<br />
under this framework<br />
and mechanism need to<br />
be sustainable, comply with adequate local consultation<br />
processes, set a path to (net) zero emissions,<br />
incorporate indigenous technologies, and be inclusive.<br />
As a result, there is a bias towards smaller-scale<br />
projects [2] .<br />
Additionally, there is the not always specified but<br />
often also considered avoidance of lock-in technologies,<br />
which are technologies requiring a longer-term<br />
perspective <strong>for</strong> their implementation, economic<br />
pay-off, or deployment. This, again, discourages<br />
considering nuclear technology. This bias can be<br />
empirically verified by reviewing the projects financed<br />
by the Green Climate Fund and the activities<br />
undertaken by the Climate Technology Center and<br />
Network as examples. A review of these projects also<br />
shows the absence of nuclear energy, technology, or<br />
any capacity building related to them [2] .<br />
On the other hand, there is no indication that these<br />
conditionalities also apply outside the scope of the<br />
<strong>for</strong>malized institutions under PA 10/11. In other<br />
words, they are not applicable to bi/multilateral or<br />
private actions. While some of these are currently<br />
emerging, many questions regarding them remain<br />
unanswered. Chief among them is whether they<br />
really belong to PA 10/11. Most interpretations of<br />
the Agreement take these Articles to only recognize<br />
actions taken within the framework and the mechanism.<br />
These are identified with bodies established by<br />
the Convention. But even bi/multilateral or private<br />
actions were recognized under PA10/11, methodological<br />
difficulties regarding their verification<br />
and comparability remain. So far, all (of the few)<br />
methodologies have been developed <strong>for</strong> activities<br />
undertaken by the bodies under the Convention.<br />
PA 6.8 offers more leeway; by design and by the current<br />
state of its negotiations, it is more open, broader,<br />
and flexible. There are several reasons explaining<br />
this: First, PA 6.8 relies explicitly on cooperation<br />
between Parties; it does neither establish any type<br />
of body nor request the Convention to develop specific<br />
criteria, methodologies, or guidance. Second, it<br />
is Party-driven, letting it open to Parties to interpret<br />
on their own the meaning of “integrated, holistic<br />
and balanced”. Third, it<br />
explicitly acknowledges<br />
all the dimensions of the<br />
Agreement, mitigation,<br />
adaptation, finance,<br />
technology transfer,<br />
and capacity building,<br />
thus opening a door to<br />
actions aiming at combining<br />
them. Fourth,<br />
it emphasizes not only<br />
sustainable development but also the reduction of<br />
poverty. And fifth, it calls <strong>for</strong> private-public partnership<br />
[9] .<br />
Making the Case <strong>for</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> in PA 6.8<br />
Activities under PA 6.8 are party-driven and do not<br />
need to comply with any criteria other than the ones<br />
specified by the Parties involved. The only two safeguards<br />
to be considered are the transnationality of<br />
the cooperation and the absence of an exchange of<br />
units (independently from whether they are priced<br />
in a market). Activities under PA 6.8 are also open<br />
<strong>for</strong> substate and non-state agents, provided their cooperation<br />
fulfills these safeguards.<br />
<strong>Nuclear</strong> technology seems to be a good fit <strong>for</strong> such<br />
activities. It has the advantage of when employed<br />
to generate electricity, mitigating emissions, at least<br />
in comparison to many other <strong>for</strong>ms of production.<br />
It also enables adaptation through electrification,<br />
which, in turn, is beneficial to sustainable development<br />
and the reduction of poverty [10]. However,<br />
this relationship might be well known in circles with<br />
sympathies <strong>for</strong> nuclear technology but is not evident<br />
to negotiators. It is even denied by most pressure<br />
groups, which outnumber negotiators in the meetings<br />
of the Parties to the Convention. While this lack<br />
of knowledge might not influence directly an activity<br />
incorporating nuclear technology – the activity only<br />
needs the agreement of the participating agents –it<br />
can still become the object of discord in the interactive<br />
modes of the Agreement when Parties comment<br />
on each other’s ambitions and instruments, the<br />
Global Stocktake. The more important that well-established<br />
research demonstrates the relationship<br />
Energy Policy, Economy and Law<br />
<strong>Nuclear</strong> Energy under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement ı Henrique Schneider