Communications Regulatory Authority

generation networks also make possible the preparation of fixed-mobile integrated
services that enable the operator to meet all the end user’s communication needs, i.e. the
possibility to approach the customer with a single integrated offering
(fixed/mobile/Internet/IPTV). For these reasons, the rules concerning the access to new
generation networks are a crucial junction for the future structure of the sector.
The regulatory Authorities thus find themselves in the situation of having to
identify the proper balance that can, on the one hand, encourage investments in network
innovation and, on the other, ensure the conditions suitable for guaranteeing free
competition in the sector and the single markets making it up.
The initiatives undertaken by the regulatory Authorities in recent years have, in
particular, been conducive to a transition to a competition model based on the use of
alternative infrastructure to that of the incumbent operator. The measures adopted in the
various contexts depend inevitably on the country’s infrastructure situation, in particular
on the presence or absence of alternative networks to those of the incumbent operator.
In the United States, the prevailing trend is that of an easing of the regulatory
constraints on infrastructure operators owing to the presence of a certain degree of
competition within the networks.
Falling within this regulatory strategy is the process of revision of the rules
governing telecommunications services carried out by the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) to evaluate their adequacy for the changed market context
(“Triennial Review”). The Triennial Review Remand Order, published by the FCC in
early February 2005, removed some of the obligations that had previously been set for
the local incumbent carriers (ILECs) regarding access of the alternative operators
(CLECs) to the elements of their networks (Unbundled Network Element-Platform –
UNE-P). Similarly, the FCC eliminated the obligation, also for the ILECs, to allow
access to their broadband networks, under fair and non-discriminatory conditions and at
prices regulated by the independent ISPs. Access to these networks will thus be the
subject of free negotiation by the parties.
Underlying these decisions is, as already mentioned, the changed US
competitive context, which sees, among other things, the presence of local networks
(especially cable) in alternative to the copper infrastructure used for providing
broadband access services. In this framework, the FCC feels that the removal of the
obligations in force will stimulate investments in the broadband network infrastructure
by operators that do not have infrastructure of their own and that, even in the absence of
regulatory obligations, there are reasons (of economic convenience) that will lead the
ILECs to provide broadband connectivity services to independent ISPs under conditions
that will meet their needs.
More in general, even the Community regulatory approach, like that of the US,
has the goal of stimulating an infrastructure type competition and not the mere resale by
alternative operators of the incumbent carriers’ wholesale services; this goal must be
reached in a context of national markets characterized by the presence of a few (if not
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