The Economics of Desertification, Land Degradation, and Drought

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governing land use patterns (Leemans and Kleidon 2002; Herrmann and Hutchinson 2005; Lambin 2002). Although such a list is not exhaustive, it can help group the actors involved and provide a better understanding of their rationale. Table 4.1—List of actors affecting land use decisions Actors Potential criteria for typology Example 86 Type of use/impact on use (Direct) Land user Individual ⎯ collective, Farmer, forester, herder Agriculture, livestock private ⎯ public, raising, forestry, tourism, commercial ⎯ subsistence industrial use Landowner Individual ⎯ collective; private ⎯ public Community, landlord, farmer Renting out land, selling land, monitoring of user Government Local ⎯ national Ministries, municipalities Design land policies, environmental laws; market access; research and development for agricultural uses; subsidies for inputs Customary institutions Local ⎯ collective Village or clan chiefs Customary land tenure administration Industries National ⎯ international; different scales and sectors Beneficiaries of ecosystem services Local, national, and international; legitimate ⎯ illegitimate; public ⎯ private; payment or not NGOs National ⎯ international; direct ⎯ indirect involvement; area of operation; budget size International organizations and development agencies Research institutes and academia Source: Author’s compilation. National ⎯ international; different scales, budget, and sectors; mandate National ⎯ international; different size and focus Commercial agriculture producers; industries with negative externalities on land and water Tourists; breweries; consumer of drinking water; herders Wildlife and biodiversity conservation; poverty alleviation and rural development; off-farm employment and education; legal advice UNCCD; WB; GTZ; KFW; DFID/UK Aid; FAO, ADB, AfDB CGIAR; Universities; IFPRI; ZEF; DIE Large-scale production of food or cash crops; leather production and tannery; paper industry Recreation; water consumption Direct land use (for example, buying of rain forest); impact on land use (for example, the Forest Stewardship Council); training and extension services Financial and technical assistance to direct users; advice to governments and policymakers; legal enforcement Research on and monitoring/measurement of DLDD; understanding drivers and informing political decisionmaking
Institutions for Land Management: What Matters, Why, and How to Improve? Based on aforementioned layers of institutions and groups of actors, and building on earlier discussions of the causes of DLDD (Section 3), this section will discuss (i) which incentive structures matter for actors, (ii) what policies are most affecting DLDD, and (iii) how to approach institutional design for better outcomes. Box 4.2—Customary institutions matter: An example from the Maasai in East Africa and Buddhists in Burma The Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania The Maasai have a unique, environmentally friendly custom that sets them apart from surrounding communities in East Africa. The Maasai are pastoral communities with strong traditional livelihoods, and they have outlived the onslaught of modernity. One of the strong features of the Maasai tradition is that they do not eat wild game meat (Asiema and Situma 1994) or cut a live tree. This shows their strong environmentally friendly tradition, which other surrounding communities do not have. Before the colonial period, the Maasai lived in what are now game parks and harmoniously shared the ecosystem services with wildlife. The Maasai regard trees as landmarks of water sources, cattle routes, and medicinal herbs (Ole-Lengisugi 1998). This is one of the reasons that the government of Tanzania allows only the Maasai to live in the game parks. The Green Monks of Burma One of the Buddhists’ key tenets of environmental friendliness is their compassion toward all living beings. This tenet, called metta, states that all Buddhists should abstain from destroying any living being (Nardi 2005). Due to this, Burma (Myanmar) is one of the countries in Asia and Oceania that have largest forested area; the others are China, Australia, Indonesia, and India (FAO 2011). However, recent economic hardships have led to deforestation in Burma. From 1990 to 2000, the deforestation rate was 1.2 percent; this rate fell to 0.9 percent during 2000–2010, which is more than twice the deforestation rate of 4 percent in Southeast Asia (FAO 2011). How to Improve Institutional Design to Lower DLDD Having discussed different areas of policy affecting DLDD, which policy and institutional design is most appropriate for enhancing the role of institutions to address DLDD? Decentralization, Involvement of Local Communities, and Capacity Building One of the major reasons behind the failure of centralized governments to effectively manage land resources is the lack of involvement of local communities in managing and benefiting from natural resources and the financial resources for managing resources (Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom 2005). This exclusion creates alienation, which in turn leads to poor cooperation between local communities and natural resource managers. Therefore, the aim is that local people should participate jointly in problem identification and in the design of culturally appropriate and sustainable solutions. Participatory approaches usually imply active engagement of local people and agencies that goes beyond eliciting the views of individuals, extending to processes of interactive dialogue, collective learning, and joint action. This type of approach values local knowledge in addition to the usual scientific and technical knowledge. A participatory approach may help deal with the complexity of land management decisions through the use of more creative tools and techniques, rather than through centralized management, which tends to have limited local knowledge and, in developing countries, limited human and financial resources to enforce natural resource management regulations. In some instances, decentralization efforts took center stage in efforts to address the poor management of natural resources by central governments take place (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Devas and Grant 2003), which is a recognition of the role of local communities and their institutions. A longterm study that examined the effectiveness of various forms of institutional settings to manage forest resource, conducted by the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI), generally observed that locally managed forest resources are better managed than centrally managed forest resources (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). It is estimated that about one-quarter of forests in developing countries are under some form of community-based forest management (FAO 2011; CIFOR 2008). The share of community-based managed forests is also increasing due to decentralization efforts and 87
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IFPRI Discussion Paper 01086 May 20
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Contents Abstract vii Acknowledgmen
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List of Figures 1.1—Conceptual fr
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ABSTRACT Attention to land degradat
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB Asia
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SCAR Soil Conservation in Agricultu
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In the present report, the conceptu
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Framework: Confronting Action versu
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understand these arrangements in or
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Figure 1.3—Prevention, mitigation
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on assessments at the micro level (
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does not clearly distinguish betwee
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Figure 2.1—GLASOD (1991) global a
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International Earth Science Informa
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Box 2.1—Continued Normalized Diff
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Figure 2.4—Loss of annual NPP, GL
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Figure 2.7—Annual loss of NPP in
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Table 2.2—Nitrogen application ra
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Figure 2.12—Areas affected by hum
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output—which is a selection of su
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GLADIS also underlines the linkage
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Box 2.2—Continued A map on global
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Table 2.3—Global land degradation
Page 48 and 49: Table 2.3—Continued Project and d
Page 50 and 51: Table 2.4—Continued Location 10 2
Page 52 and 53: Table 2.6—Extent and severity of
Page 54 and 55: National Level Policies As discusse
Page 56 and 57: Such support has also been directed
Page 58 and 59: Migration, either as outmigration o
Page 60 and 61: The preceding discussion shows the
Page 62 and 63: Results Correlation Analysis Consis
Page 64 and 65: Figure 2.23—Relationship between
Page 66 and 67: Effects of Land Degradation On-Site
Page 68 and 69: soils and higher land productivity.
Page 70 and 71: Acknowledging the work of GLADIS, a
Page 72 and 73: health, education, security, enviro
Page 74 and 75: Box 3.1—Recent major economic ass
Page 76 and 77: An appropriate economic tool for a
Page 78 and 79: Figure 3.4—Cost of action and cos
Page 80 and 81: enefit—for example, income. This
Page 82 and 83: Figure 3.6—Ecosystem services fra
Page 84 and 85: Replacement Cost Approaches The rep
Page 86 and 87: Box 3.2—Measuring land degradatio
Page 88 and 89: land degradation and conservation m
Page 90 and 91: Flooding and Aquifer Recharge Richa
Page 92 and 93: year (Diao and Sarpong 2007). Sonne
Page 94 and 95: Bringing together the different cos
Page 96 and 97: This section discusses the most imp
Page 100 and 101: promotion of community forest manag
Page 102 and 103: Box 4.3—Reducing emissions from d
Page 104 and 105: Soil Nutrient Depletion Soil nutrie
Page 106 and 107: that the yields of salt-tolerant wh
Page 108 and 109: Figure 5.3—Forest area as a perce
Page 110 and 111: Figure 5.5—Per capita water stora
Page 112 and 113: Introduction 6. CASE STUDIES Five c
Page 114 and 115: Salinity The effects of salinity on
Page 116 and 117: Third, to correctly decide which ac
Page 118 and 119: Costs of Action and Inaction We eva
Page 120 and 121: The NGOs and religious organization
Page 122 and 123: have a strong influence on NRM (And
Page 124 and 125: We estimated the cost of action (de
Page 126 and 127: Figure 6.15—Costs of action and i
Page 128 and 129: Of interest to us is the strategy t
Page 130 and 131: 7. PARTNERSHIP CONCEPT The review o
Page 132 and 133: degradation. All this should be don
Page 134 and 135: Finally, the global assessment of D
Page 136 and 137: the experience of and lessons learn
Page 138 and 139: Table 7.3—Example of E-DLDD resea
Page 140 and 141: 8. CONCLUSIONS Since the publicatio
Page 142 and 143: lowest in the region. From a socioe
Page 144 and 145: Table A.1—Land degradation assess
Page 146 and 147: Table A.2—Continued Author Region
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Table A.3—Continued Author Countr
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Table A.5—Costs of land degradati
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Figure B.1—Land use systems of th
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REFERENCES Abelson, P. 1979. Cost B
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Benin S., E. Nkonya, G. Okecho, J.
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Clark, E. H. 1985. The Off-Site Cos
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De Jager a., D. Onduru and C. Walag
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Foster, V., and C. Briceño-Garmend
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Holden, S. and H. Lofgren. 2005. As
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Lapar, M. L., and S. Pandey. 1999.
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Nachtergaele, F., M. Petri, R. Bian
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Pender, J. L. 2009. “Food Crisis
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Sauer, J., and H. Tchale. 2006. Alt
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Tan, Z. X., R. Lal, and K. D. Wiebe
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———. 2010. “Assessment of L
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