Bringing the Empire Back In54 the imperial form of government inclu<strong>de</strong>s increasingly higher proportions of the world’s population.Virtually none of the territories of the currently existing states in the world has beenalien or outsi<strong>de</strong> some large mo<strong>de</strong>rn empire. Among the very few exceptions are Thailand(which emerged from the old kingdom of Siam without Western colonization) and Israel(which was created from scratch in 1948).The present world is organized in at least five very large, powerful empires. In alphabeticalor<strong>de</strong>r, which may coinci<strong>de</strong> with the or<strong>de</strong>r of their relative strength, they are: America, China,Europe, Japan, and Russia. These five political units encompass nowadays about 40 percentof the world’s population (and 80 percent of the world’s production). Five more verylarge units could also be consi<strong>de</strong>red of the imperial type, at least in terms of the size andvariety of their population, and, in most cases, the multilevel fe<strong>de</strong>ral-type of their internalorganization; they are: India, closely linked to Pakistan and Bangla<strong>de</strong>sh, Indonesia and Brazil(Australia and Canada have comparable territorial sizes to the empires mentioned, butthey are heavily un<strong>de</strong>r-populated). In all ten units together live more than two-thirds of theworld’s populations at the beginning of the 21st century.A world’s single-government is not foreseeable from historical <strong>de</strong>velopments. If the ten<strong>de</strong>ncytoward increasingly larger sizes of empire, as measured by territory, is extrapolated, wefind only a 50 percent probability of a single world empire by a date placed between 2200and 3800 (<strong>de</strong>pending on the author making the calculation). If the extrapolation is based onthe proportion of the world’s population within the largest empire, that expectation shouldbe <strong>de</strong>ferred to nothing less than the year 4300.5. Europe as an EmpireNowadays, the traditional West European mo<strong>de</strong>l of sovereign, homogeneous nation-stateis obsolete even in Europe. After a few centuries of continuous and increasing warfare, thelarger European states found a new way for peace and prosperity by building a new kind ofEurope-wi<strong>de</strong> empire after the Second World War. Its most recent expansion was a consequenceof the end of the Cold War, which brought about the Soviet disunion of the Russianempire and the disintegration of the multiethnic Yugoslavia. Within a couple of years after1991, 20 new in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt republics were created in Central and Eastern Europe and CentralAsia. But many of these either sought their salvation by applying to membership to theincreasingly large, <strong>de</strong>mocratic and market-oriented European empire, or languished isolatedin the hands of dictatorial and ineffectual rulers.One may hear that the current institutional formulas of the European Union are “unique”,“exceptional” or “unprece<strong>de</strong>nted”. This is in<strong>de</strong>ed a frequent assertion in certain journalisticliterature and political speech. For a social scientist, however, this only means that we arenot using a sufficiently broad analytical concept capable of including this case among thosewith common relevant characteristics. The appropriate concept could be that of ‘empire’,as <strong>de</strong>fined above. The European Union is in<strong>de</strong>ed a very large political unit (the third inpopulation in the current world), it has expan<strong>de</strong>d continuously outward without previouslyestablished territorial limits, it is organized diversely across the territory and has multiple,<strong>GCG</strong> GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA <strong>2008</strong> VOL. 2 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116
Josep M. Colomeroverlapping institutional levels of governance. The point that the European Union may notbe “unique” was addressed, for instance, by James Caporaso (1997). For a comparison betweenthe process of constitutional building of the European Union and of the United Statesof America, see Richard Bellamy (2005). The war motives in building large empires like theEuropean one were remarked by William H. Riker, (1987, 1996). The vision of the EuropeanUnion as a new kind of empire was sketched by Robert Cooper (2003).55Elsewhere, the West European mo<strong>de</strong>l of the sovereign state has been much less successful.The United States of America was created from the beginning, rather than as a nation-state,as a “compound republic” formed by previously existing units retaining their constituentpowers. Instead of concentrating power around a single center like in the European-stylestates, the American empire is organized with a “checks and balances” regime based ondivision of powers, negotiations and jurispru<strong>de</strong>nce. The mo<strong>de</strong>l of the United States not asa sovereign state, but as a “compound republic”, has been elaborated, among others, byVincent Ostrom (1987).In Asia, a few very large, overpopulated empires have also escaped from the project ofstatization: China, the compound India-Pakistan-Bangla<strong>de</strong>sh, as well as Indonesia and Japan,have maintained certain traditional imperial characteristics of internal complexity, notadopting the homogenizing features of mo<strong>de</strong>rn European states mentioned above. Unlikein either North America or Asia, attempts to replicate the typical European ‘state’ form ofgovernment were ma<strong>de</strong> in Hispanic America, Africa and the Middle East as a consequenceof the colonial expansion of European states and the further in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce of their colonies.In<strong>de</strong>ed, the larger and more powerful states of Europe, which had been created as an alternativeformula to empires, engen<strong>de</strong>red new colonial empires in other parts of the world. Butwhen the people of the colonies rid themselves of imperial domination, paradoxically, theyalso lost the large-scale networks of imperial size able to provi<strong>de</strong> common security, opentra<strong>de</strong> and other large-scale service. They did nothing but imitate the old ‘state’ forms ofgovernment of their former masters. The experience has been much less successful than itwas in the metropolis --in many cases, a failure in<strong>de</strong>ed.6. Concluding CommentsThe 200 or so members of the United Nations can be distinguished with a few categories,according to the <strong>de</strong>finitions given above. There are, in the current world, about 10 very largeempires. There are also about three-dozen successful large states, which coinci<strong>de</strong> for themost part with the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.The larger ones tend to be organized with fe<strong>de</strong>ral formulas containing smaller political units.A similar number of about three-dozen states can be consi<strong>de</strong>red to have failed. And wecan count more than 100 small formally in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt countries that would hardly be viablewithout large networks of ‘imperial’ size; they inclu<strong>de</strong> about 70 mini-states with a populationbetween one and ten million inhabitants and 40 more micro-states with less than one millioninhabitants, among them most members of the European Union.In addition, there are more than 500 non-state political units with governments and legis-<strong>GCG</strong> GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA <strong>2008</strong> VOL. 2 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116
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Revista cuatrimestral Four-monthly
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Francesco D. SandulliTabla 1: Medic
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Francesco D. SandulliTal y como se
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Francesco D. SandulliEn el segundo
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Francesco D. SandulliBibliografía1