Tfhio - JScholarship - Johns Hopkins University

TERTULLIAN'S DEFENCE OF THE CHRISTIANS
AGAINST THE HEATHEN
CHAP. I. If it is not permitted even to you, who are the
governors of the Roman Empire, seated on a lofty and conspicuous
tribunal, which I might almost call the very summit of
our state; if, I say, even you may not openly investigate and
judge in the presence of both parties, what are the real facts in
the case of the Christians; if in this instance alone your authority
is either afraid or ashamed to make public inquiry with regard
to the scrupulous observance of justice; if, finally, as has
recently happened, the persecution of this sect, having been
too much exercised in trials connected with households, has
blocked up the way to defence—, then let the truth be permitted
to reach your ears, if only by the hidden path of silent literature.
She asks no mercy in her case, because she does not feel any
surprise either as to her circumstances. She knows that her
part is that of a foreigner upon earth, that amongst aliens she
easily finds enemies, while she has her race, her home, hope,
welcome and honour in heaven. One thing only does she
eagerly desire in the meantime, narnely that she be not condemned
without being known. What loss is herein inflicted on
the laws, which are absolute masters in their own realm, if she
should be heard ? Or will this make them boast all the more of
their power, in that they condemn the truth even when they
have heard it? Further, if they should condemn it unheard,
besides the odium attached to unfair dealing, they will also earn
the suspicion of a certain complicity, by their refusal to hear
what, if heard, they could not condemn. This then is the first
proof that we lay before you of the injustice of your hatred
towards the name of Christian. This _ unfairness is at once
exaggerated and refuted by the same plea that seems to excuse
it, namely ignorance. For what could be more unfair than that
men should hate that of which they know nothing, even if the
fact deserve this hatred? For then only does the fact deserve
hatred, when it is already ascertained whether it deserves it.
In default of the knowledge of its deserts, whence can the justice
1—2