Dirt: The Erosion of Civilizations - Kootenay Local Agricultural Society
Dirt: The Erosion of Civilizations - Kootenay Local Agricultural Society
Dirt: The Erosion of Civilizations - Kootenay Local Agricultural Society
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
tion. <strong>The</strong> number <strong>of</strong> hungry Chinese fell by more than 50 percent, from<br />
more than 400 million to under 200 million. Excluding China, the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> hungry people increased by more than 10 percent. <strong>The</strong> effectiveness<br />
<strong>of</strong> the land redistribution <strong>of</strong> the Chinese Revolution at reducing hunger<br />
shows the importance <strong>of</strong> economic and cultural factors in fighting hunger.<br />
However we view Malthusian ideas, population growth remains critical—<br />
outside <strong>of</strong> China, increased population more than compensated for the<br />
tremendous growth in agricultural production during the green revolution.<br />
Another key reason why the green revolution did not end world hunger<br />
is that increased crop yields depended on intensive fertilizer applications<br />
that the poorest farmers could not afford. Higher yields can be more pr<strong>of</strong>itable<br />
to farmers who can afford the new methods, but only if crop prices<br />
cover increased costs for fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery. In third<br />
world countries the price <strong>of</strong> outlays for fertilizers and pesticides increased<br />
faster than green revolution crop yields. If the poor can’t afford to buy<br />
food, increased harvests won’t feed them.<br />
More ominously, the green revolution’s new seeds increased third-world<br />
dependence on fertilizers and petroleum. In India agricultural output per<br />
ton <strong>of</strong> fertilizer fell by two-thirds while fertilizer use increased sixfold. In<br />
West Java a two-thirds jump in outlays for fertilizer and pesticides swallowed<br />
up pr<strong>of</strong>its from the resulting one-quarter increase in crop yields in<br />
the 1980s. Across Asia fertilizer use grew three to forty times faster than rice<br />
yields. Since the 1980s falling Asian crop yields are thought to reflect soil<br />
degradation from increasingly intensive irrigation and fertilizer use.<br />
Without cheap fertilizers—and the cheap oil used to make them—this<br />
productivity can’t be sustained. As oil prices continue climbing this century,<br />
this cycle may stall with disastrous consequences. We burned more<br />
than a trillion barrels <strong>of</strong> oil over the past two decades. That’s eighty million<br />
barrels a day—enough to stack to the moon and back two thousand times.<br />
Making oil requires a specific series <strong>of</strong> geologic accidents over inconceivable<br />
amounts <strong>of</strong> time. First, organic-rich sediment needs to be buried faster<br />
than it can decay. <strong>The</strong>n the stuff needs to get pushed miles down into the<br />
earth’s crust to be cooked slowly. Buried too deep or cooked too fast and<br />
the organic molecules burn <strong>of</strong>f; trapped too shallow or not for long enough<br />
and the muck never turns into oil. Finally, an impermeable layer needs to<br />
seal the oil in a porous layer <strong>of</strong> rock from which it can be recovered. <strong>The</strong>n<br />
somebody has to find it and get it out <strong>of</strong> the ground. It takes millions <strong>of</strong><br />
years to produce a barrel <strong>of</strong> oil; we use millions <strong>of</strong> barrels a day. <strong>The</strong>re is no<br />
question that we will run out <strong>of</strong> oil—the only question is when.<br />
dirty business 199