Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts

150 Bernard Shaw’s Remarkable Religion
ism. The idealist follows moral principles; the realist looks at the outcomes
of actions. Whether Shaw was explaining Ibsen in the Quintessence, defending
his own method in “A Dramatic Realist to His Critics,” or proposing
socialist reform, his question was never how to be true to his principles
but how to achieve certain ends. In the battles between the purists and
compromisers of socialism, Shaw insisted that his “own side in the controversy
was the unprincipled one, as Socialism to me has always meant, not
a principle, but certain definite economic measures which I wish to see
taken” (Impossibilities 3).
The distinction can lead to significant differences. We are not talking
about instances in which the apostles of principle and the followers of
product, or final result, have different values. If their values are opposed,
the principled men will fight among themselves, and the realists will do the
same. The crucial test comes when the values of the idealist and the realist
are identical. Suppose that we are faced with a choice between two profoundly
unpleasant outcomes. We will give them the labels “A” and “P.”
No other alternative is possible. Idealist and realist agree that, considered
strictly as outcomes, P is much worse than A. Let us say that A = (one man
dies), and P = (one hundred men die). Circumstances do not permit us to
console ourselves with the belief that any of these unfortunates deserve
such a fate; they are equally admirable. So far there is no disagreement
between idealist and realist. But let us suppose further that P will result
from doing nothing and that A involves an active choice. Your choice is
then to do nothing and passively accept the demise of one hundred men, or
to save them by actively participating in the death of one. You must kill
one man to save one hundred. The realist will be certain to assure herself
that these are indeed the only two alternatives and that no other complications
affect the decision (for example, that the man’s death, while sparing
the one hundred in question, may start a riot in which a thousand die).
Then she will choose based on the perceived outcomes. The idealist will
seek a rule, and a rule that comes to mind is “Thou shalt not kill.” He thus
chooses to avoid violation of the commandment and accepts the death of
the one hundred as something he could not prevent without becoming
tinged with personal evil.
There is no certain, rational way to choose between these exceedingly
unpleasant alternatives. The idealist could argue that there are certain
acts—such as murder—that are so vile that they are inexcusable regardless
of the total outcome. The realist can say only that while she would
rather save one hundred one lives, one hundred is unquestionably prefer-