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Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts

Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts

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The Marriage of Science and <strong>Religion</strong> 225<br />

Here, mental event “β” produces a series of physical events (γ, δ, . . .)<br />

quite different from <strong>the</strong> one above. Bertrand Russell said that “modern<br />

physics . . . reduces matter to a set of events which proceed outward from a<br />

centre. If <strong>the</strong>re is something fur<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> centre itself, we cannot know<br />

about it, and it is irrelevant to physics” (Outline 163). <strong>That</strong> is not quite<br />

true. If <strong>the</strong>re is something “inside” that changes <strong>the</strong> behavior of those<br />

events, physics would need new <strong>the</strong>ories to account for such behavior. In<br />

any case, we do know something of <strong>the</strong> “insides” of things: our own minds.<br />

We also have reason to believe that it changes things. <strong>That</strong> suggests that<br />

science is incomplete in a fundamental way. Science would correctly, as<br />

Russell implies, refrain from speculating about <strong>the</strong> “insides” of <strong>the</strong> “centres”<br />

that physics concerns itself with so long as such speculation explains<br />

nothing about what can be known in a simpler, more economical way. But<br />

science does posit <strong>the</strong>ories about things it cannot know directly if those<br />

<strong>the</strong>ories can explain observable phenomena. No one has seen a lepton or<br />

hadron, but <strong>the</strong>ir existence is inferred as an explanation for events that can<br />

be seen. If a simpler, more parsimonious <strong>the</strong>ory comes along, <strong>the</strong>y will<br />

disappear just as phlogiston disappeared with <strong>the</strong> advent of <strong>the</strong> chemical<br />

<strong>the</strong>ory of fire.<br />

The epiphenominalists might still argue that mental properties that<br />

appear to be <strong>the</strong> causes of our intentional, purposeful behavior are really<br />

just “tacked on” to purely physical processes that are as yet not understood,<br />

but <strong>the</strong> burden of proof would be on <strong>the</strong>m to show how that could be<br />

possible. To <strong>the</strong> argument that merely asserting that organisms tend to<br />

seek pleasure and avoid pain is an assertion of mental causation that cannot<br />

be accounted for physically, <strong>the</strong> epiphenomenalists could answer that<br />

pain and pleasure could simply be “mental” manifestations of physical<br />

forces, possibly even physical forces we already understand: we are already<br />

familiar with forces that repel and those that attract. But desire acts<br />

through <strong>the</strong> complex of our united conscious awareness, which is an extraordinarily<br />

complicated occurrence. It is not enough to be hungry; we<br />

must also be able to recognize food and know how to obtain it. It is possible<br />

to program a robot to “recognize” images (although it is proving very dif-

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