Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
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The Marriage of Science and <strong>Religion</strong> 209<br />
matter and those who were convinced that mind was <strong>the</strong> sole substance of<br />
existence. The proponents of matter were known as “realists” and <strong>the</strong> disciples<br />
of mind as “idealists.” People who believed that both mind and matter<br />
exist and are yet quite distinct from one ano<strong>the</strong>r (a group that, <strong>the</strong>n as<br />
now, included most nonphilosophers) were “dualists.” Nowadays, those<br />
formerly known as “realists” usually refer to <strong>the</strong>mselves as “materialists”<br />
and <strong>the</strong>ir opponents as “dualists.” Idealism, in its purest forms, is not much<br />
heard from, but its concepts are important in establishing <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong><br />
debate. Dualism is now usually associated with Descartes, who articulated<br />
an extreme form of <strong>the</strong> doctrine. Because dualism accords so nicely with<br />
unreflective common sense, most people probably just take it for granted<br />
that both mind and matter exist and are distinct entities, but an unintended<br />
consequence of Descartes’ precise formulation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory was that he<br />
made clear its logical difficulties. In particular, it is difficult, given strict<br />
dualism, to understand how mind and matter can interact, as common<br />
sense and most philosophies say <strong>the</strong>y must. But if dualism is rejected,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re appear to be two absurd (to common sense) alternatives. One leads<br />
to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that minds do not really exist and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r to solipsism:<br />
<strong>the</strong> doctrine that only “I” exist. Specifically, that only <strong>the</strong> present<br />
contents of my awareness exist. The materialists had to explain <strong>the</strong> first<br />
absurdity and <strong>the</strong> idealists <strong>the</strong> second. Idealism was once marginally favored<br />
by philosophers and realism by scientists—on <strong>the</strong> rare occasions<br />
when scientists thought about philosophy. Nowadays idealism is hardly<br />
ever mentioned, and “realism” (that is, materialism) is—at least by <strong>the</strong><br />
materialists, who have a solid hold on orthodoxy—held up as <strong>the</strong> opposite<br />
of dualism. Dualism is often equated with “Cartesianism”—as if any dualistic<br />
philosophy must be identical to Descartes’s. The contempt for Descartes<br />
so blatant in materialist writings is both ironic and unfair. The strict<br />
separation of <strong>the</strong> material from <strong>the</strong> spiritual helped protect an infant material<br />
science from <strong>the</strong> censorious attentions of a zealous church. <strong>That</strong> may<br />
have been its purpose. Now that science and <strong>the</strong> materialistic viewpoint are<br />
triumphant, Descartes is condemned for allowing a role for spirit at all. He<br />
could hardly, given his historic circumstances, have done o<strong>the</strong>rwise.<br />
Shaw’s condemnation of <strong>the</strong> scientist for failure to live up to his own<br />
myths may have been vindicated by <strong>the</strong> acceptance of Kuhn’s version of<br />
scientific progress, but Shaw’s rejection of materialism is unquestionably<br />
not in keeping with present orthodoxy. The nineteenth-century materialism<br />
of George Eliot and John Tyndall which Shaw dismissed as passé<br />
would be derided by contemporary materialists as vitiated by timorous