Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
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44 <strong>Bernard</strong> Shaw’s <strong>Remarkable</strong> <strong>Religion</strong><br />
we have no more case against <strong>the</strong>ism than <strong>the</strong>ists have against a<strong>the</strong>ism.<br />
Newman shewed that our line of argument led to an insufferably<br />
repugnant conclusion. When we replied that we found <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />
congenial, he had nothing more to say. Similarly, all we can do<br />
is to shew that his reasoning led to insufferably repugnant conclusions.<br />
The Newmanite replies that <strong>the</strong> conclusions appear to him to<br />
be perfectly satisfactory. What more have we to say? The irresistibility<br />
of a chain of logic lies, not in <strong>the</strong> logic, but in <strong>the</strong> acceptability of<br />
<strong>the</strong> conclusion to <strong>the</strong> person addressed. (302)<br />
Shaw used similar arguments throughout his life against <strong>the</strong> claims of<br />
those, particularly scientists, who claimed strict objectivity for <strong>the</strong>ir views,<br />
but here his position is particularly strong and general. Here is ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
apparent case of Shavian inconsistency, for this extreme subjectivist viewpoint<br />
coincides almost exactly with <strong>the</strong> publication of <strong>the</strong> Quintessence,<br />
yet <strong>the</strong> realist Shaw describes <strong>the</strong>re would appear to be quite immune to<br />
<strong>the</strong> criticism that he “sees what he looks for, and hears what he listens for,<br />
and nothing else.” And Shaw had written two years earlier that “we have<br />
had in this century a stern series of lessons on <strong>the</strong> folly of believing anything<br />
for no better reason than that it is pleasant to believe it” (“The Economic<br />
Basis of Socialism” 26). Contradiction seems inherent in <strong>the</strong> very<br />
presentation of <strong>the</strong> argument, as anyone who could point out, as Shaw<br />
does, that his own side’s logic is no stronger than that of his opponent<br />
would not seem to be seeing and hearing only what desire dictated. But<br />
does <strong>the</strong> realist’s immunity to this subjective blindness really invalidate<br />
<strong>the</strong> argument?<br />
Realism and Wishful Thinking<br />
In a paradoxical way it actually helps to confirm it, for <strong>the</strong> realist’s faith in<br />
<strong>the</strong> sufficiency of his own will is precisely what frees him from <strong>the</strong> blinders<br />
imposed by his “will-to-believe.” Even liberating ideals are <strong>the</strong> refuges<br />
of cowardice; <strong>the</strong>y are masks we use to pretend that <strong>the</strong> objects of our wills<br />
have greater authority than our mere desire. Only <strong>the</strong> realist is strongminded<br />
enough to drop<br />
<strong>the</strong> pessimism, <strong>the</strong> rationalism, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ology, and all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r subterfuges<br />
to which we cling because we are afraid to look life straight in<br />
<strong>the</strong> face and see in it, not <strong>the</strong> fulfilment of a moral law or of <strong>the</strong><br />
deductions of reason, but <strong>the</strong> satisfaction of a passion in us of which<br />
we can give no account whatever. It is natural for man to shrink from