Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
Bernard Shaw's Remarkable Religion: A Faith That Fits the Facts
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The Marriage of Science and <strong>Religion</strong> 189<br />
tion, but it was torn apart by Karl Popper. Popper pointed out that science<br />
cannot actually verify anything except possibly <strong>the</strong> most trivial of individual<br />
facts. It relies on abstract <strong>the</strong>ories that cannot be verified because<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are complicated systems of inference, and it has been understood, at<br />
least since Hume, that no inference can ever be made with absolute certainty.<br />
But science does have an effective means of testing hypo<strong>the</strong>ses. While it<br />
cannot verify, said Popper, it can falsify. No <strong>the</strong>ory can be absolutely verified<br />
because a single counterinstance can always disprove any <strong>the</strong>ory. The<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory that perpetual motion is impossible could be disproved, for instance,<br />
with <strong>the</strong> construction of a single perpetual motion machine. This<br />
provides science, however, with a criterion for distinguishing a good scientific<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory from a bad one: a good <strong>the</strong>ory is one that is easily subjected to<br />
potential falsification and has actually survived many attempts to falsify<br />
it. A bad scientific <strong>the</strong>ory is one that is immune to falsification, one that<br />
provides an answer to any possible set of circumstances. Freudian psychology<br />
is, by this standard, a bad <strong>the</strong>ory because it provides an answer to any<br />
conceivable objection by its critics. If you protest that you do not harbor<br />
homicidal feelings toward your fa<strong>the</strong>r or lustful ones about your mo<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Freudian can smile a superior smile and say: “Of course not: You have<br />
repressed <strong>the</strong>se desires and forced <strong>the</strong>m into your unconscious.” There is<br />
no way to prove him wrong. When Creationists dispute <strong>the</strong> fossil evidence<br />
for <strong>the</strong> age of <strong>the</strong> earth or <strong>the</strong> evolution of life by saying that God placed<br />
misleading evidence in our way as a test of our faith, <strong>the</strong>y securely protect<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>the</strong>ory from falsification. But such <strong>the</strong>ories should not be automatically<br />
dismissed as “nonsense,” as <strong>the</strong> Logical Positivists insisted, for <strong>the</strong>y<br />
may have important heuristic value; <strong>the</strong>y may lead us toward truths that<br />
are presently inaccessible to more rigorous methods. Indeed, <strong>the</strong>y may<br />
even be perfectly true; <strong>the</strong>y merely are not scientific.<br />
While Popper’s observations may seem like a warning to science against<br />
assuming to know too much, in ano<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>the</strong>y flattered <strong>the</strong> scientists<br />
by reinforcing part of <strong>the</strong> scientific myth. <strong>That</strong> is <strong>the</strong> myth that science is<br />
profoundly skeptical, always doubting, probing, and testing its own <strong>the</strong>ories,<br />
ever ready to discard its most cherished beliefs without hesitation at<br />
<strong>the</strong> moment, like Andrew Undershaft with his experimental weapon, if it<br />
turns out <strong>the</strong> least bit wrong. The <strong>the</strong>ory of scientific falsification allows<br />
scientists to think of <strong>the</strong>mselves as intellectually humble, courageously<br />
open-minded, and ruthless with respect to <strong>the</strong> flaws in <strong>the</strong>ir own thinking—quite<br />
unlike <strong>the</strong> traditional authorities on <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> cosmos,