progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group

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The Telmarc Group PROGRESSIVISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL Burkeans insist on small steps rather than earthquakes….they also emphasize the need for judges to pay careful heed to established traditions and to avoid independent moral and political arguments of any kind…" He compares that to Rationalists and Traditionalists. To him a Rationalist seeks answers to "what is the reason for the tradition…" and Traditionalists are antithetical to so loose an approach. Then he states: "Burkean minimalists usually defend themselves by reference to a many minds argument…" This is his jumping off point for taking the idea to extremes. Many minds means just that, minds in the US as well as elsewhere. The many minds doctrine is where he drags in to the Constitution the laws of any and all other lands, whether they apply or not. He does this by introducing the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Simply put the Jury Theorem states 172 : "If there are N people making a judgment on a subject, and each of the people judge independently and each person is a rational entity possessing equal knowledge of the facts, then if the judgment is a binary choice between A and B, and the facts as perceived by any rational entity would favor A over B, then if a secret ballot is taken amongst the N jurors and a simple majority vote of the N is required to decide between A and B, then the probability of the jury choosing A goes to 1 as N goes to infinity." 172 Sunstein really it plowing over well worn ground. It was Arrow who in both his doctoral thesis and his early work at Rand developed his theory of social choices, it was Sen in his various earlier works and it was even Nozick who dismisses Sen's argument in Anarchy that others have focused on this point. It is also in Baumol where he goes through several detailed analyses showing the intransitive behavior of such choices (see Baumol 404-407). This Sunstein has gone back to a well worn argument which has been subsequently discredited in part and built his entire thesis about it. Let me demonstrate with an example from Baumol. Assume three people with four choices, and each person ranks their choices from 1 to 4 as below: A B C D Jones 4 3 2 1 Smith 4 3 2 1 Brown 2 1 4 3 10 7 8 5 Clearly choice A wins. And A>C>B>D is the ranking by the vote of each. Now let us assume we drop B, it is irrelevant since at best it was 3rd we obtain: A C D Jones 3 2 1 Smith 3 2 1 Brown 1 3 2 7 7 4 Now A and B are tied and there is no clear decision. The transitive nature does not exist. This is another example of the quirks of voting and decision making. Page 172
The Telmarc Group PROGRESSIVISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL Frankly there are a lot of ifs in this Theorem. Let me state it simply with an example. We will assume the following: 1. There are N jurors. 2. Each Juror makes an independent decision. 3. Each Juror has identical information and is intellectually, morally, socially equal. There is no bias based on the facts presented. 4. The evidence is such that each and every Juror will have a probability of p of selecting outcome A and a probability q (1-p) of selecting outcome B. 5. There are an odd number of jurors. 6. The Jurors vote in blind ballots and the selection is based upon the majority vote. Namely if we have 1 Juror, that Juror decides, if we have 3 Jurors, 2 decide and so forth. Now consider the case of 1 and 3 Jurors. One Juror: P[A]=p P[B]=1-p Three Jurors: P[A]=p 6 p 3 PB [ ] (1 p) 3 2 Clearly as N gets bigger the probability of B goes to zero and A goes to 1. However. recent work has shown that there are substantial conflicts and inconsistencies. Dietrich has shown 173 : "that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of probability considered; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified." Dietrich continues: Let me start by sketching a tempting but sloppy argument that seems to support the CJT.s two premises, and hence its striking conclusion. Consider for instance a group of judges 173 See Dietrich, The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified, Maastricht University & LSE. Web: www.personeel.unimaas.nl/f.dietrich , March 2008. Also see Yukio Koriyama and Balázs Szentes , A Resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, Department of Economics, University of Chicago, Sept 2007. Page 173
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The Telmarc Group and the Progressi
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progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group

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