progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group
progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group
progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group
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The <strong>Telmarc</strong> <strong>Group</strong><br />
PROGRESSIVISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE PUBLIC<br />
INTELLECTUAL<br />
"Equality does not signify that kind of ma<strong>the</strong>matical or physical equivalence in virtue of<br />
which any one element may be substituted for ano<strong>the</strong>r. It denotes effective regard for<br />
whatever is distinctive <strong>and</strong> unique in each. It is not a natural possession but it is a fruit of<br />
<strong>the</strong> community when its action is directed by <strong>the</strong> character of <strong>the</strong> community."<br />
This is a statement of what we now call multi-culturalism, relativism, <strong>and</strong><br />
communitarianism. Dewey states effectively that we are what we are only as reflected by<br />
our community, <strong>the</strong> society we belong to. We have no individuality at all. There is not<br />
natural possession of our person as a single unique individual but only as a cog in a<br />
wheel, albeit a slightly different cog, but recognizable only as <strong>the</strong> whole, namely <strong>the</strong><br />
wheel.<br />
Boisvert also states: 89<br />
""Individuality" identifies <strong>the</strong> distinctive manner in which someone participates in<br />
communal life. It signifies uniqueness, irreplaceability. "Individualism" connotes both<br />
isolation <strong>and</strong> self interestedness. It assumes <strong>the</strong> opposition of self <strong>and</strong> community.<br />
"Individuality" …suggests a mode of participation. It recognizes <strong>the</strong> irreducibility of<br />
community <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> multiple interest associated with it."<br />
Individualism is more than what Boisvert states <strong>and</strong> less than what he presents.<br />
Individualism is <strong>the</strong> recognition that <strong>the</strong> individual, each person, has to <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
certain rights, rights to free speech, his own religion, protection from Government<br />
oppression, <strong>and</strong> more. The individual does not have to belong to some group, as long as<br />
he is a citizen. He does not have to be an Elk, a Mason, <strong>and</strong> a Democrat, to have <strong>the</strong><br />
rights as guaranteed by <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Locke guaranteed rights to property to <strong>the</strong><br />
individual. Winthrop was seeking a bond to preserve a threatened community.<br />
Fott describes Dewey <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual in contrast to Locke as follows:<br />
"His (Dewey's) view of <strong>the</strong> origin of <strong>the</strong> state is directly opposed to <strong>the</strong> tradition of liberal<br />
<strong>individualism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> social contract. The state does not arise "by direct conscious<br />
intent". He (Dewey) continues "<strong>the</strong> idea of a natural individual in his isolation possessed<br />
of full-fledged wants of energies to be expended according to his own volition <strong>and</strong> of a<br />
ready-made faculty of foresight … is as much a fiction…as <strong>the</strong> doctrine of <strong>the</strong> individual<br />
in possession of antecedent political rights …"" 90<br />
This is a direct rejection by Dewey of <strong>the</strong> individual <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights that apply to that<br />
individual. It must be so since Locke <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Founders stated clearly that those rights<br />
accrue from God <strong>and</strong> as an avowed a<strong>the</strong>ist <strong>the</strong>re is thus no source for those rights so <strong>the</strong>y<br />
89 Boisvert p. 68.<br />
90 See Fott p. 33.<br />
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