progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group
progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group
progressivism, individualism, and the public ... - Telmarc Group
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The <strong>Telmarc</strong> <strong>Group</strong><br />
PROGRESSIVISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE PUBLIC<br />
INTELLECTUAL<br />
On <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, we also identify a welfare loss associated to oversized committees.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, we show that this loss is surprisingly small in certain environments.<br />
Therefore, <strong>the</strong> careful design of a committee might not be as important an issue as it was<br />
originally thought to be, as long as <strong>the</strong> committee size is large enough. In fact, if ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>the</strong> information structure is ambiguous, or <strong>the</strong> committee has to make decisions in<br />
various informational environments, it might be optimal to design <strong>the</strong> committee to be as<br />
large as possible.<br />
The reason committee design receives a considerable attention by economists is that in<br />
many situations, groups ra<strong>the</strong>r than individuals make decisions. Information about <strong>the</strong><br />
desirability of <strong>the</strong> possible decisions is often decentralized: individual group members<br />
must separately acquire costly information about <strong>the</strong> alternatives. A classical example is<br />
a trial jury where a jury has to decide whe<strong>the</strong>r a defendant is guilty or innocent. Each<br />
juror may individually obtain some information about <strong>the</strong> defendant at some effort cost<br />
(paying attention to <strong>the</strong> trial, investigating evidences, etc.).<br />
We spend a great deal of time going back <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing this Jury Theorem because it<br />
become <strong>the</strong> heart of Sunstein's view on how to deal with <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Namely he<br />
relies heavily on this principle having dozens of pages referring to it. He argues that by<br />
having an open Court with majority opinions using <strong>the</strong> same facts will result in <strong>the</strong> best<br />
result. In fact this <strong>the</strong>n becomes his basis for introducing non US law since that just adds<br />
to <strong>the</strong> opinion base <strong>and</strong> he argues that <strong>the</strong> result will improve <strong>the</strong> judgments. However<br />
when one looks at <strong>the</strong> facts, <strong>the</strong> opposite is true.<br />
As Sunstein states about <strong>the</strong> Constitution 174 :<br />
"…Madison did not believe that <strong>the</strong> Constitution ought to be set in stone. He accepted <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitution's procedures for constitutional amendment…Jefferson had an altoge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
different view. Indeed he believed that Madison's approach badly disserved <strong>the</strong><br />
aspirations for which <strong>the</strong> American Revolution had been fought. Jefferson insisted "<strong>the</strong><br />
dead have no rights"…"<br />
This quote from Jefferson has become <strong>the</strong> cornerstone for all those like Sunstein who see<br />
a flexible Constitution, a document which means whatever a small group at <strong>the</strong> time seem<br />
to think it means. For Sunstein takes glee in stating 175 :<br />
"…Jefferson had his revenge - not through formal amendments, but through social<br />
practices <strong>and</strong> interpretations that render <strong>the</strong> Constitution very different from <strong>the</strong><br />
founder's Constitution…"<br />
174 Sunstein, Constitution, pp 1-2.<br />
175 Sunstein, Constitution, p. 3.<br />
Page 175