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The <strong>Telmarc</strong> <strong>Group</strong><br />

PROGRESSIVISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE PUBLIC<br />

INTELLECTUAL<br />

Sunstein <strong>the</strong>n spends endless pages telling why this Burkean approach relying on <strong>the</strong> Jury<br />

Theorem established <strong>the</strong> Jeffersonian dream of a flexible Constitution reflecting <strong>the</strong><br />

changes in society. We have seen <strong>the</strong> same in Wilson a century earlier. They both accept<br />

<strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n find reasons for abrogating <strong>the</strong> words <strong>and</strong><br />

reinterpreting it in a manner consistent with whatever views may be current. All without<br />

any formal amendment to <strong>the</strong> Constitution itself.<br />

Sunstein examines <strong>the</strong> Jury Theorem metaphor in many areas, <strong>and</strong> he seems to go back<br />

<strong>and</strong> forth on its validity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> influence of many minds on <strong>the</strong> decision process.<br />

Towards <strong>the</strong> end he raises <strong>the</strong> issue of foreign law. Specifically he states 176 :<br />

"There is an initial question, involving <strong>the</strong> Who Votes? problem. Supports <strong>the</strong> court seeks<br />

to determine whe<strong>the</strong>r some law X has some desirable effect Y. The court observes that<br />

most o<strong>the</strong>r nations have enacted X, but it also discovers that in <strong>the</strong> aggregate more<br />

legislators oppose X than support it - in <strong>the</strong> states with X a bare majority of <strong>the</strong><br />

legislators are in favor, while in states without X nearly all legislators voted against <strong>the</strong><br />

law. Should <strong>the</strong> court count <strong>the</strong> states with <strong>the</strong> law…Who votes?...<strong>the</strong> question is easy to<br />

answer…<strong>the</strong> court should focus on <strong>the</strong> people who have <strong>the</strong> best information <strong>and</strong> who are<br />

<strong>the</strong>refore most likely to be right..."<br />

Sunstein <strong>the</strong>n exp<strong>and</strong>s this argument to international law. Simple, his words are often<br />

much too long <strong>and</strong> overbearing at times, suppose <strong>the</strong> US is considering to pass a law X,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re are N countries with X already. They have <strong>the</strong> same underlying issue<br />

requiring X. Should <strong>the</strong> court take <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> N countries have X into account when<br />

adjudging <strong>the</strong> law? Sunstein seems to say it should. That is <strong>the</strong> more informed<br />

information <strong>the</strong> better, even if <strong>the</strong> US law is moot on <strong>the</strong> point at h<strong>and</strong>. This becomes <strong>the</strong><br />

backdoor approach for using foreign laws in US jurisprudence.<br />

This method of logic is used throughout <strong>the</strong> Sunstein work. He contends in a Wilsonian<br />

manner that <strong>the</strong> Constitution should reflect <strong>the</strong> conditions at h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> that those sitting in<br />

judgment must take into account all factors no matter whence <strong>the</strong>y came. In a sense this<br />

approach is <strong>the</strong> anti<strong>the</strong>sis of classic English law, <strong>the</strong> law of precedents, where <strong>the</strong> judge<br />

relies on prior cases under English law.<br />

6.5.2 Libertarian Paternalism<br />

In <strong>the</strong> book Nudge, Sunstein <strong>and</strong> his co-author Thaler introduce what <strong>the</strong>y see as an<br />

alternative approach to get people to do <strong>the</strong> right thing. They call it libertarian<br />

paternalism.<br />

They state 177 :<br />

176 Sunstein, Constitution, pp 192-193.<br />

177 Thaler <strong>and</strong> Sunstein, Nudge, p 5-6.<br />

Page 176

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