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submission - Independent Pilots Association

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L rer lauSue lagtors tn a\]¿tuu¡r .¡\ie r\¡ç¡¡.<br />

C?t<br />

F/O<br />

FIE<br />

¡IIII<br />

llrillt<br />

Figwe I. CreY' Sleep/Takc Histories<br />

The crew hed been offdqy up to 2 days priot to the accident trip and then flown<br />

overnigbt cargo schedules for the two nights ptiot to the accident, and had been assigned<br />

the accident trip uneryectedly on the morning of August 18, shortly after being released<br />

from duty. The erctra trip involved segments from Atlanta to Norfolk, VA to Gr¡antan¡mo<br />

Bay back to Atlanta, approximately 12 hrs of fl.ight time in 24 hrs of duty. The figure<br />

ptór.id"t information on the fatigue factors: I ) the individual crew members had an acute<br />

il""p loss (i.e., 5,6,8 hrs of daytme sleep). 2) were continuousl¡' awake 19.21, and 23.5<br />

hrs prior to the accident, and 3) the accident occured just prior to 5 pm local time during<br />

the afternoonwindow of sleepiness (this did not rePresent a time zone change for this US<br />

E¿st coast crew). Upon inquiry, there were no rsPorted symptoms or signs of a sleep<br />

d.isorder. Therefore, all three of the initial fatigue factors were operating in this accident.<br />

There were two principal sources of data available on fhgbt crew perfonnance in the<br />

accidsnt: cocþit voice recorder (CVR) and Captain's testimony at the NTSB publ-rc<br />

hearing. There were four performance effects related to fatigue that significantly<br />

contrr-buted to the accident: I ) degraded decision-making, 2) visuaVcognrtive fixation, 3)<br />

poor çps1¡armication/coordittation, and 4) slowed reaction time.<br />

A complete description of flight operations, fatigue factors, perfonnance effects, a¡ld<br />

accident investigation findings a¡e available in the full NTSB accident report ( I ). Based on<br />

the findinp, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of tlus accident included the<br />

impaired judgment decision-making, and flying abilities of the captain and flightcrew due<br />

to the effects of fatigue. This was the fi¡st time in a major U.S. aviation accident that the<br />

NTSB cited fatigue in the probable cause. As a result of this investigation, the NTSB<br />

recourmended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) expedite the revier*'and<br />

upgrade of Ftight/Duty Time Limitations of the Federal Aviation Regulations to ensure<br />

that they incorporate the results of the latest resea¡ch on fatigue and sleep issues. The<br />

NTSB reiterated a recorrrmendation to require U.S. air ca¡riers to include, as part of pilot<br />

training a prognm to educate pilots about the detrimental effects of fatigue and strategies<br />

http://oli¡s.arc.n¡ìs¿t.gov/publicationJrosekind/GB/GB.Abstract.html<br />

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