Cultural Theory and Popular Culture

Watching Dallas 151
in its narrative development and character interactions. The letter-writer who uses this
strategy is caught between the dismissive power of the ideology and the pleasure she
obviously derives from watching Dallas. Her letter seems to suggest that she adheres to
the former when viewing with friends, and to the latter when viewing alone (and perhaps
secretly when viewing with friends). As Ang explains: ‘irony is here a defence
mechanism with which this letter-writer tries to fulfil the social norms set by the
ideology of mass culture, while secretly she “really” likes Dallas’ (109).
As Ang shows, the fans of Dallas find it necessary to locate their pleasure in relation
to the ideology of mass culture; they ‘internalize’ the ideology; they ‘negotiate’ with the
ideology; they use ‘surface irony’ to defend their pleasure against the withering dismissal
of the ideology. What all these strategies of defence reveal is that ‘there is no
clear-cut ideological alternative which can be employed against the ideology of mass
culture – at least no alternative that offsets the latter in power of conviction and coherence’
(109–10). The struggle therefore, as so far described, between those who like
Dallas and those who dislike it, is an unequal struggle between those who argue from
within the discursive strength and security of the ideology of mass culture, and those
who resist from within (for them) its inhospitable confines. ‘In short, these fans do not
seem to be able to take up an effective ideological position – an identity – from which
they can say in a positive way and independently of the ideology of mass culture:
“I like Dallas because . . .”.’ (Ibid.).
The final viewing position revealed in the letters, one that might help these fans, is
a position informed by the ideology of populism. At the core of this ideology is the
belief that one person’s taste is of equal value to another person’s taste. As one letterwriter
puts it: ‘I find the people who react oddly rather ludicrous – they can’t do anything
about someone’s taste. And anyway they might find things pleasant that you just
can’t stand seeing or listening to’ (113). The ideology of populism insists that as taste
is an autonomous category, continually open to individual inflection, it is absolutely
meaningless to pass aesthetic judgements on other people’s preferences. Given that this
would seem to be an ideal discourse from which to defend one’s pleasure in Dallas,
why do so few of the letter-writers adopt it? Ang’s answer is to point to the ideology’s
extremely limited critical vocabulary. After one has repeated ‘there’s no accounting for
taste’ a few times, the argument begins to appear somewhat bankrupt. Compared to
this, the ideology of mass culture has an extensive and elaborate range of arguments
and theories. Little wonder, then, that when invited to explain why they like or dislike
Dallas, the letter-writers find it difficult to escape the normative discourse of the ideology
of mass culture.
However, according to Ang, there are ways to escape: it is the very ‘theoretical’ nature
of the discourse which restricts its influence ‘to people’s opinions and rational consciousness,
to the discourse people use when talking about culture. These opinions and
rationalizations need not, however, necessarily prescribe people’s cultural practices’
(115). This would in part explain the contradictions experienced by some letterwriters:
confronted by both ‘the intellectual dominance of the ideology of mass culture
and the “spontaneous”, practical attraction of the populist ideology’ (ibid.). The
difficulty with adopting the populist ideology for a radical politics of popular culture