Cultural Theory and Popular Culture
Cultural Theory and Popular Culture
Cultural Theory and Popular Culture
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220<br />
Chapter 10 The politics of the popular<br />
argues that the two aesthetics articulate relations of power. Without the required<br />
cultural capital to decipher the ‘code’ of art we are made socially vulnerable to the<br />
condescension of those who have the required cultural capital. What is cultural (i.e.<br />
acquired) is presented as natural (i.e. innate), <strong>and</strong> is, in turn, used to justify what are<br />
social relations. In this way, ‘art <strong>and</strong> cultural consumption are predisposed . . . to fulfil<br />
a social function of legitimating social differences’ (7). Bourdieu calls the operation of<br />
such distinctions the ‘ideology of natural taste’ (68). According to the ideology, only a<br />
supposedly instinctively gifted minority armed against the mediocrity of the masses<br />
can attain genuine ‘appreciation’. Ortega y Gasset makes the point with precision: ‘art<br />
helps the “best” to know <strong>and</strong> recognise one another in the greyness of the multitude<br />
<strong>and</strong> to learn their mission, which is to be few in number <strong>and</strong> to have to fight against<br />
the multitude’ (31). Aesthetic relations both mimic <strong>and</strong> help reproduce social relations<br />
of power. As Bourdieu observes,<br />
Aesthetic intolerance can be terribly violent. . . . The most intolerable thing for<br />
those who regard themselves as the possessors of legitimate culture is the sacrilegious<br />
reuniting of tastes which taste dictates shall be separated. This means that the<br />
games of artists <strong>and</strong> aesthetes <strong>and</strong> their struggles for the monopoly of artistic legitimacy<br />
are less innocent than they seem. At stake in every struggle over art there is<br />
also the imposition of an art of living, that is, the transmutation of an arbitrary way<br />
of living into the legitimate way of life which casts every other way of living into<br />
arbitrariness (57).<br />
Like other ideological strategies, ‘The ideology of natural taste owes its plausibility <strong>and</strong><br />
its efficacy to the fact that . . . it naturalises real differences, converting differences in<br />
the mode of acquisition of culture into differences of nature’ (68).<br />
In an argument that draws heavily on the work of Bourdieu, Paul Willis (1990)<br />
argues that the aesthetic appreciation of ‘art’ has undergone an ‘internal hyperinstitutionalization’<br />
(2) – the dissociation of art from life, a stress on form over function – in<br />
a further attempt to distance itself <strong>and</strong> those who ‘appreciate’ it from the ‘uncultured<br />
mass’. Part of this process is the denial of the necessary relationship between aesthetics<br />
<strong>and</strong> ‘education’ (understood in its broadest sense to include both formal <strong>and</strong><br />
informal): the production <strong>and</strong> reproduction of the necessary ‘knowledge’ on which<br />
aesthetic appreciation is founded. In denial of such a relationship, aesthetic appreciation<br />
is presented as something innate, rather than something learned. Rather than<br />
seeing this as a question of non-access to knowledge – they have not been ‘educated’<br />
in the necessary code to ‘appreciate’ the formal qualities of high culture – the majority<br />
of the population are encouraged to view ‘themselves as ignorant, insensitive <strong>and</strong><br />
without the finer sensibilities of those who really “appreciate”. Absolutely certainly<br />
they’re not the “talented” or “gifted”, the elite minority held to be capable of performing<br />
or creating “art”’ (3). This manufactures a situation in which people who make<br />
culture in their everyday lives see themselves as uncultured. Against the strategies of the<br />
‘internal hyperinstitutionalization’ of culture, Willis argues the case for what he calls<br />
‘grounded aesthetics’: the process through which ordinary people make cultural sense