The Jeremiad Over Journalism

importance of Danish participation in NATO, from an American perspective, makes the late 1940s
the natural point of departure for an analysis of structural Americanization. 247
3.1.1 Power of the weak
―Danish reservations about American leadership within this [Western] community stem from two
causes,‖ wrote Public Affairs Officer William G. Roll in 1951 to the Department of State and
added, ―[f]irst, statements lifted from their contexts, as e.g. President Truman‘s statement about the
use of the atomic bomb, or statements to which undue weight is attached, such as those of ex-
President Hoover, are sometimes taken by Danish opinion-leaders as evidence of lack of constancy
in American foreign policy.‖ 248
As the quote shows, Danes had not wholehearted embraced American influence on Danish foreign
policy by 1951. On the contrary, Danish politicians in the 1950s recognized the importance of good
relations with the United States but also worked hard to maximize what could be gained from its
wealthy ally and ensure that Danish domestic politics were not affected (too much) by outside
interests. As Villaume has argued, Danish politicians in the 1950‘s were strongly encouraged by
American officials to spend more on defense in exchange for the economic support provided
through the Marshall plan, but Danish politicians wanted to spend the money on domestic
programs. Consequently, the Americans in 1955 concluded that the Danish government had not
invested enough in the countrys military and as a result considered cutting economic aid. In the
end, however, the United States decided against decreasing Danish assistance partly because it
could ―weaken USA‘s position in Greenland.‖ 249
Denmark‘s ability to resist American political pressure to a large part hinged on the country‘s
strategic location and the relationship to Greenland. Greenland was a recurring theme in American
officials‘ reports back to Department of State and Ambassor John Gunther Dean in 1976 noted that,
―[t]here are several factors which make US interests in Denmark greater than would ordinarily be
247 Ibid. Page 97 and 112-115.
248 William G. Roll, "Effectiveness of USIE Program in Denmark," (National Archives. RG 59. Department of State.
Decimal file. 1950-1954. From 511.59/12-650 to 511.59/12-2950. Box 2422. March 8, , 1951).
249 Villaume, Allieret Med Forbehold: Danmark, Nato Og Den Kolde Krig [Allied with Reservations: Denmark, Nato
and The Cold War]. Page 348-354. According to Villaume, American officials also believed that a decrease in aid to
Denmark would weaken Prime Minister H.C. Hansen and be a pretext for further cuts in Danish defense spending.
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