Greece - US Department of State

Greece 705
some of the others, would attempt to raise the Greek question, arguing
that the question of military assistance to Greece is basically political
in nature and that it is not possible to ignore public opinion in their
countries on the issue. Even if the Greek question itself did not come
before NATO, the side effects of indirect attacks in proposed communiqué
language, in ministerial statements and in corridor discussions
would dominate these two meetings and effectively prevent progress
on other matters. We could in effect anticipate Donnybrooks and expose
the U.S. Delegations to highly emotional debates.
3. Adverse Effects on a possible Spanish Link to NATO
Preliminary discussions have already made it clear that our attempts
to further a Spanish link to NATO will be handicapped, if at
the same time the Greek question becomes active because of the resumption
of shipment of heavy arms. Some NATO Members believe
that to have both the Greek issue and the Spanish link prominent unduly
emphasizes the issue of NATO’s relationship to “dictatorships.”
For the near future, it appears wise to soft pedal the Greek issue if we
wish to promote acceptance of a NATO relationship to Spain.
4. Modalities of handling a Decision to resume Arms Shipments to Greece
a) NATO Consultation: If we consult our NATO colleagues, we must
take it for granted that much—or most—of the advice given will be negative.
A NATO endorsement of our resuming arms shipments to Greece
will be out of the question. Therefore, to consult in the North Atlantic
Council would cause difficulties. If resumption is decided, however, the
Allies, as a matter of courtesy, should be informed in advance.
b) U.S. Announcement to NATO that it intended to resume Arms Shipments:
If we were to inform but not consult our NATO colleagues of our
intention to resume arms shipments, we would, of course, relieve them
of any responsibility for our decision. Attracting to ourselves the lightning
in this way would not, however, really spare NATO, since in a
number of Western European countries criticism of the U.S. tends to
spill over into general criticism of NATO because of the dominant role
of the U.S. in NATO, accusations that the U.S. does not take into account
the wishes of its NATO partners in the formulation of its policies,
and finally, accusations that NATO is a U.S. tool in the latter’s
support of dictatorships and “repressive” policies. However, this
course would be less difficult than to consult.
c) Timing to minimize adverse Consequences for U.S. Policy in NATO:
As indicated above, it is imperative that no announcements be made
about the possible resumption of heavy military equipment deliveries
before the NATO meetings scheduled now for May 26–27 and June 11.
Laying the groundwork with our NATO colleagues before those dates
could bring on the very discussion we wish to avoid.