Greece - US Department of State

698 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
the USG stopped the delivery of certain “high visibility” military equipment
items to Greece following the April 1967 coup. While this tactic
may initially have contributed to internal political progress on the part
of the GOG, notably the promulgation of the 1968 Constitution, it has
not otherwise appreciably accelerated a return to democratic government.
On the other hand it has produced several side-effects increasingly
adverse to U.S. security interests: (1) tended to strengthen the
radical anti-democratic faction within the Greek revolutionary government
against Papadopoulos’ seemingly more moderate constitutionalist
approach; (2) by undercutting Greece’s military potential has
degraded the credibility of NATO in Soviet eyes on the strategic southeast
flank; (3) prejudiced U.S.-Greek military cooperation and thus
weakened U.S. influence over Greece’s military dispositions; and (4)
led the GOG to look elsewhere for military equipment with good promises
of satisfaction. At the same time, the U.S. MAP curtailment policy
has been popular with domestic and foreign opponents of the Greek
regime, particularly in Western Europe and the U.S. Congress and has
kept lines open to sincerely democratic elements whose views and support
cannot be ignored. On balance the evidence does not sustain their
unrealistic thesis that more drastic pressure on the Greek Junta, by the
U.S. in the first instance, would lead to the Colonels’ rapid demise.
They appear to be firmly in the saddle.
III. Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Restore Suspended Equipment and Continue U.S. MAP for Greece
at Adequate Level. Since the U.S. MAP withholding policy has proved
ineffective in accelerating a return to democratic government in Greece,
and is beginning to undermine the country’s NATO-committed defensive
strength, it should be abandoned. I also recommend that future
year U.S. military aid to Greece be maintained at a level calculated
to strengthen Greece’s contribution to NATO. Such a policy constitutes
a necessary element of the U.S. objective of preventing further Soviet
penetration of the key Eastern Mediterranean area. If U.S. aid is not
forthcoming, either as grant or sales, the Greek Government will obtain
such military equipment elsewhere. The resulting diversion of
scarce foreign exchange could retard Greece’s economic development
and thus favor the ascendancy of anti-democratic forces in Greece. Regional
political equilibrium requires a fair balance between U.S. military
assistance for both Greece and Turkey.
2. Continue to Press Greek Regime to Return to Constitutional and Representative
Government. Concurrently, we must continue to press the
Greek regime to return to the form of representative government which
best meets Greece’s needs. American friendship is more important to
the GOG than military equipment; and the GOG’s failure to make internal
political progress is eroding this friendship in the U.S. We should