14.08.2013 Views

Greece - US Department of State

Greece - US Department of State

Greece - US Department of State

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

716 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX<br />

281. Telegram From the Embassy in <strong>Greece</strong> to the <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>State</strong> 1<br />

Athens, June 12, 1970, 1608Z.<br />

3034. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos.<br />

1. I met with Prime Minister Papadopoulos today accompanied<br />

by Admiral Richardson, 2 whom PM expressed desire to see. The PM<br />

expressed his fears regarding Soviet intentions in Eastern Mediterranean,<br />

particularly possible effort on part <strong>of</strong> Soviets to open up Suez<br />

by driving Israelis back from Canal. PM also said that in his view major<br />

target <strong>of</strong> Soviets in this decade is Africa, particularly North Africa.<br />

PM was also concerned that in face <strong>of</strong> rising Soviet threat cohesiveness<br />

<strong>of</strong> Alliance shows signs <strong>of</strong> serious weakness as reflected in political attacks<br />

on NATO member <strong>Greece</strong> inspired ultimately by political warfare<br />

tactics <strong>of</strong> Soviets, as well as in increasing weaknesses <strong>of</strong> military<br />

contribution to common defense on northern flank. PM said in reply<br />

to Admiral Richardson’s expression <strong>of</strong> appreciation for facilities<br />

granted <strong>US</strong> Navy in Crete that there was no need to mention or even<br />

thank <strong>Greece</strong> for these facilities now. Our interests were common and<br />

it was in Greek interest to make these facilities available.<br />

2. In reply we stressed importance <strong>of</strong> Greek contribution within a<br />

strong alliance, whose cohesiveness is indispensable to NATO strength.<br />

PM countered by saying that cohesiveness was important but could be<br />

purchased at disastrous price if prerequisite for Scandinavians <strong>of</strong> bringing<br />

back Papandreou were to be fulfilled, a possibility which he completely<br />

excluded. PM asked where would cohesiveness principle be for<br />

Scandinavians if <strong>US</strong> were to request NATO assistance in extreme contingency<br />

arising out <strong>of</strong> Middle East conflict.<br />

3. I told PM I might be leaving for <strong>US</strong> in next several days on consultation.<br />

He said he would never again raise question <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> military<br />

assistance because he questioned seriously whether <strong>US</strong> had the capacity<br />

to overcome resistance to aid to <strong>Greece</strong>, such a denial <strong>of</strong> aid being<br />

a high priority Soviet political warfare objective against the <strong>US</strong>. <strong>Greece</strong><br />

would be faithful to the alliance but it would buy to the extent necessary<br />

the arms it needed to defend the country against communism,<br />

however costly these might be.<br />

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593,<br />

Country Files, Middle East, <strong>Greece</strong>, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is ibid., RG 59,<br />

Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE.<br />

2 Admiral David C. Richardson, Commander <strong>of</strong> the Sixth Fleet.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!