Greece - US Department of State

Greece 727
3. Supplementary assumptions—
a. Papadopoulos, as the leading figure in the collegiate Greek
Regime, has the greatest breadth of those in his group. I believe he sincerely
intends to implement the constitution and restructure Greek
political life, though he has not been explicit as to the timing of the last
step—elections.
b. Some of the other Revolutionary officers are less enthusiastic
than Papadopoulos about implementing the 1968 Constitution. (For a
discussion of the dynamics of the present Regime, see my telegram
Limdis Athens–970 of March 2, 1970.) 3
c. In addition to our quiet diplomacy and personal persuasion,
to advance the date of full implementation of the 1968 Constitution, and
to influence the Greek Government to take other public steps to improve
its reputation at home and abroad, [11 ⁄2 lines not declassified]:
(1) To influence Greek authorities to relax security restrictions,
to reduce resort to and hopefully to end martial law, and to
adhere to its commitments to implement the 1968 Constitution.
(2) To influence the Greek authorities to avoid other repressive
measures which do political damage to Greece without filling
a decisive security need.
(3) To promote the concept of a reconciliation of the various
non-Communist factions within Greece.
4. The time has now come to move even more positively in direct
support of our aims here in Greece as well as in opposition to the well
identified Soviet and other Communist tactics. Specifically, I therefore recommend
that the Department obtain interagency approval for a [less than
1 line not declassified] program which would embrace these five points—
a. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to facilitate implementation
of the 1968 Constitution by convincing doubtful elements within the
Regime of the practicality of this move, encouraging those elements
who are already disposed in that direction and building up momentum
in public media in Greece and abroad for a sincere implementation
of the Constitution.
b. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to counter Communist efforts
to exploit the Greek issue to split NATO and to isolate Greece by
breaking her economic, political, and military ties with Western Europe
and North America.
c. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to assist in rebuilding democratic
institutions in Greece through the provision of [less than 1 line
not declassified] advice and assistance and the persuasion of key Revolutionary
officers that elections under the 1968 Constitution will be in
their long-range interest. (It is in U.S. interest to see healthy institutions
created and a return to the chaotic period of 1966 avoided.)
d. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to encourage closer ties of
Greece with the non-Communist Western world, ties which have been
strained in the period since April 1967.
3 Document 269.