Greece - US Department of State

Greece 643
Greece, willy-nilly, continues to play a necessary role. I can hardly
imagine that responsible NATO member governments like the British,
the Germans, and certainly the French, would tax us too severely for
contributing to adequate Greek military preparedness, however unsatisfactory
a government the country may have.
A U.S. decision to restore the full Greek MAP will unquestionably
have to be matched by a parallel decision to make clear to the GOG
that this move is based essentially on military and strategic considerations,
and does not signify U.S. approval of their internal policies. (The
formula we used in October 1968 of “remaining no less interested in
constitutional progress” is still a perfectly useable one, in my view.)
There will be no problem about doing this privately in conversation between
Ambassador Tasca and Prime Minister Papadopoulos, or between
the Ambassador and other ranking members of the Junta. The
trick will be to get this key point over to the internal Greek Opposition
and to the exercised parties in our Congress and in NATO. This might
well call for a public statement, depending on whether the GOG tries
to distort the significance of the decision. Or if we don’t want to go this
far, there are several other means (press backgrounders, planted queries,
etc.) of disseminating our position. I would personally favor a somewhat
bolder and firmer stand in this respect than we have taken in the
past, for, despite our frequent assertions that we continue to “press” the
GOG to make democratic progress, the pressure has been largely private
and pretty mild. In sum, it should not exceed our ingenuity to devise
some formula which would achieve the twin purpose of getting
out from under the disadvantages of continuing the MAP suspension,
and at the same time of indicating forcefully that the type of friendly
and cooperative relations between Greece and the United States which
we desire will continue to depend on further movement in Greece toward
representative government. This would be easier to do, I think, if
we had signified our confidence in them militarily.
Let me turn briefly now to the tactical side of the picture. I think
it’s very important that Ambassador Tasca be given the maximum
leverage from the outset; and even if a decision to restore the MAP
should have been taken before he arrives in Athens, this ought to be
withheld temporarily from the GOG. He should indicate to them early
in his talks that the final decision on this important matter will depend
on the recommendations he makes to the President and Secretary of
State after he has had an opportunity to review the whole question sur
place. I believe the Ambassador ought, however, to be in a position to
assure the Greeks that a definite decision will be reached by some specific,
early date, such as December 1. I have serious misgivings about
trying to string the GOG along much further, and certainly not beyond
the end of the year at the latest. I would suppose, incidentally, that the
business of Ambassador Tasca’s confirmation by the Senate, (given Sen-