Greece - US Department of State

838 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
passage of time has severely eroded historical loyalty of armed forces
to monarchy, but PM would unquestionably assure himself that he has
solid support in military before raising issue of abolishing monarchy
or deposing Constantine.
335. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1
SUBJECT
Status of Homeporting in Greece
Tasca
Washington, April 26, 1972.
In case your discussions with the Soviets 2 touch the point of our
respective military presence in the Mediterranean, I thought you
should be up to date on the present status of the Navy’s homeporting
proposal for Greece. Also, it is not going smoothly and could either fail
altogether or reach a point of friction with the Greeks. The main purpose
of this memo is to give you a chance to inject any thoughts that
may arise from your dealings with the Soviets.
Background: You will recall that the Navy’s Greek homeporting proposal
is justified purely as an administrative measure to improve
morale and increase personnel retention. It will not substantially increase
the number of ships deployed in the eastern Mediterranean or
our military capabilities in the region.
We now have in Greece about 6,100 personnel including dependents.
Homeporting, if fully carried out, would boost that permanent presence
by some 3,500. The main elements of the original proposal were:
—Phase I—Within Six Months After Agreement: Assignment of a Carrier
Task Force headquarters staff, involving some 56 personnel and 22
families (57 dependents) in Athens.
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594,
Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information.
Concurred in by Odeen and Sonnenfeldt. “OBE” appears on the first page of the
memorandum.
2 Apparently at the Moscow Summit May 22–30.