Greece - US Department of State

Greece 607
If anything is clear at this juncture, in the aftermath of the Prime
Minister’s December 14th speech, 6 and even more so of the Stamatelopoulos–Ladas
hassle, 7 it is that the Papadopoulos government
is indisputably in control of the country, and is accordingly going to
proceed in the course of the coming months, or possibly even years, at
a pace of its own choosing, which is likely to be slow and deliberate.
The Prime Minister has won the first round with his recalcitrant hardline
Secretaries General (if, indeed, a really serious conflict has ever existed
in this area) and seems to see eye-to-eye with General Angelis,
who has emerged with the reorganized HNDGS in a very powerful
and independent position. In the circumstances, what compelling reasons
has Papadopoulos to act otherwise?
There are two potential lines of development (or a combination of
the two) which could force him to do so: 1) the growth of serious and
organized internal opposition (generated by protracted oppression
and/or grave economic deterioration); and, 2) the rise of similarly serious
opposition externally, including in particular, that of the United
States, plus some of the other major NATO powers, like West Germany
or Italy, where there are vocal domestic political forces opposed to the
present GOG.
It must be conceded, on examining the situation dispassionately,
that neither of these adverse developments is taking place, or at least
shows any signs of doing so in sufficiently acute or immediate form to
worry the GOG. Certainly no serious domestic political opposition is
at present on the horizon. On the contrary, we are beginning to see
some evidence of a willingness on the part of the old political forces
to reach some sort of accommodation with Papadopoulos. Admittedly,
this development is in a very incipient stage and could well break down
or come to naught, particularly if Papadopoulos is not sincere, but
proves merely to be “playing games” for his own tactical purposes.
While the intellectual establishment remains unalterably and articulately
opposed to the regime (and this is not a negligible factor because
a potential leadership element is involved), there are a great many small
people (perhaps even a majority), especially in the country but also in
the cities, who don’t find the present GOG too bad, in fact are often
reasonably enthusiastic about it.
On the economic front conditions could go down hill seriously
somewhere along the road, a year or two from now, if the Government
6 The Embassy provided an analysis of the speech in telegram 8308 from Athens,
December 16, 1968. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 GREECE)
7 Dimitri Stamatelopoulos and Ioannis Ladas, two members of the original conspiratorial
group of military officers. Stamatelopoulos had become an outspoken conservative
critic of the junta while Ladas, an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Interior,
was one of its foremost spokesmen.