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Greece - US Department of State

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802 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX<br />

with politicians from last parliament, perhaps present phase may be<br />

one <strong>of</strong> reconciliation, in which case all should consider how to encourage<br />

PM to move ahead on this basis and tailor their activities accordingly.<br />

I may have persuaded the King in this sense.<br />

9. King had earlier asked whether I knew what Papadopulos<br />

wanted. Before I could answer, he said it was unlikely anyone could<br />

answer this question. I noted that one could take the position <strong>of</strong> recent<br />

article in London Observer and come out with convincing line that PM<br />

planned to do nothing, or one could look at the public and private<br />

statements <strong>of</strong> the PM and at the fact Cabinet had met nearly every Friday<br />

last year working out the implementing legislation for Constitution.<br />

I thought it was the better part <strong>of</strong> wisdom to proceed on the assumption<br />

that the PM intended to implement the 1968 Constitution<br />

and to encourage action in that direction. I noted that the Constitution<br />

provides for return <strong>of</strong> King.<br />

10. The King said he agreed with my comments on 1968 Constitution.<br />

He realized clearly the obstacles to his return, but he indicated<br />

he was willing to talk to PM. Latter, however, had had no contact with<br />

him for two years in spite <strong>of</strong> King’s expressed interest in opening such<br />

a dialogue. King noted that his return should be based upon an agreement<br />

to implement the Constitution with elections, but he was willing<br />

to be reasonably flexible on a date. He observed that his return would<br />

legitimize the Government and would be generally helpful.<br />

11. I asked him what happen in 1967. He explained he had visited<br />

Washington in September and had asked for help during a meeting<br />

with President Johnson, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow. He said he<br />

made plain all he was seeking was moral support since <strong>US</strong> force would<br />

have been unthinkable; the President told him that he could count on<br />

his moral support if he moved against the junta. 4 He had decided to<br />

move in December because he could not get the junta to agree to a specific<br />

program for return to parliamentary government. The result had<br />

been a disaster because the effort had failed. He assumed full responsibility<br />

for failure. He would not go into details, but one <strong>of</strong> reasons for<br />

failure he mentioned was his determination to avoid bloodshed.<br />

12. Since that time had had gone to Washington for Eisenhower<br />

funeral and found Vice President Agnew sympathetic and understanding.<br />

However, he was greatly disappointed because he had been<br />

unable to see President Nixon, particularly since latter saw Pattakos. 5<br />

King again returned to the need for evolution now, noting risks in delay,<br />

and mentioning especially danger <strong>of</strong> younger <strong>of</strong>ficers ousting PM.<br />

4<br />

See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; <strong>Greece</strong>; Turkey, Document<br />

301.<br />

5<br />

See Documents 243 and 244.

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