Greece - US Department of State

Greece 717
4. In reply I noted President’s deep preoccupation with Vietnam
and the repercussions from his great and courageous decision to move
against Hanoi’s forces in Cambodia, 3 a problem which would not have
arisen had his predecessors acted to move against the use of the Communist
sanctuaries to attack our own and allied troops in South Vietnam.
I also pointed to the problem of NATO cohesiveness, the maintenance
of which is an objective worth supporting. Finally, I stressed
again the importance of public opinion in the US, particularly as it affected
the Senate.
5. At this point I sought to put question of military aid into perspective,
noting our mutual obligations under the Alliance and stating
that no country could stand alone. Thus, it most important that we
keep strategic aspects of our friendship continuously in foreground.
An alliance of free countries required above all patience and understanding
for success. This was more important than military requirements,
vital as the latter might be.
6. Comment: I found PM deeply friendly as usual towards the US,
but clearly depressed by inability of US to act at a time of great danger
to the West. His attribution of our inabilities to Soviet political warfare
tactics may appear far-fetched, but the fact is he does not understand
what he appears to see as our political incapacity to face up to
public opinion in face of the growing Soviet threat, while taking into
consideration the great dedication of Greece to NATO and even more
its friendship with the US, and its status as a country publicly committed
to a democratic course. I think we should take very seriously
indeed his statement that Greece will purchase arms elsewhere (particularly
from France). With French attitude toward the Mediterranean
and the Arab-Israeli crisis being what they seem to be, in addition to
the other reasons set forth in my report to the President, I fear we may
even lose a good deal of the flexibility which we have enjoyed to date
in this most friendly country. This is not to mention the loss of bases
for the US which are important to the balance of payments equilibrium
and currency stability.
7. Request Dept pass this message to USMission NATO.
Tasca
3 On April 30 President Nixon announced that U.S. forces had entered Cambodia
to destroy the North Vietnamese Army’s line of communications. The decision set off a
serious protest in the United States. For the text of Nixon’s statement, see Public Papers:
Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410.