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Greece - US Department of State

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<strong>Greece</strong> 725<br />

3. Regime, I am convinced, is firmly entrenched, and it is only<br />

through regime that we can hope to achieve our objective <strong>of</strong> making<br />

<strong>Greece</strong> again fully acceptable to European governments and peoples<br />

and American public opinion; and for this reason alone question <strong>of</strong><br />

King’s return involves serious problems for us. But, in addition, it<br />

should be remembered that King is not the unifying force he may appear<br />

when removed in time and space from the Greek scene. Constantine<br />

was always highly controversial, and he opposed the very progressive<br />

forces which we would like ultimately to play a role again in<br />

<strong>Greece</strong>’s development. It is not only the left which would be incensed<br />

by <strong>US</strong> efforts promote King’s return but the solid majority <strong>of</strong> progressive<br />

moderate opinion. They consider King as bearing large share <strong>of</strong><br />

responsibility for breakdown in democracy prior to coup, and quite<br />

rightly so.<br />

4. Finally, even on right <strong>of</strong> political spectrum and within army<br />

King is by no means the unifying force he might be. Serious doubts are<br />

entertained about Constantine by a number <strong>of</strong> influential rightists<br />

(Eleni Vlachou is one example that comes to mind); and in middle<br />

grade <strong>of</strong> Greek army <strong>of</strong>ficer corps, King is thoroughly unpopular. He<br />

has in fact showed consistent immaturity in action and lack <strong>of</strong> the intellectual<br />

qualities that would enable him to deal with delicate situation<br />

in <strong>Greece</strong> today. His continuing flirtation with enemies <strong>of</strong> regime<br />

is typical, and we should bear in mind that regime leaders are intelligence<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficers by pr<strong>of</strong>ession and are quite well informed on King’s<br />

activities. 3<br />

5. In addition to his activities which displease regime, perhaps<br />

even more important is King’s failure to speak out in favor <strong>of</strong> full military<br />

assistance for <strong>Greece</strong>, so that Greek people may be defended<br />

against external aggression regardless <strong>of</strong> type <strong>of</strong> government which<br />

they may have at moment.<br />

6. Having said this, I would like to make it clear that I am not implying<br />

that King has no role to play in <strong>Greece</strong>. But this role can only<br />

come about when and if regime feels it must regularize its relations<br />

with the monarchy. It may well be that we will have to play an intermediary<br />

role between King and regime. However, based on my analysis<br />

<strong>of</strong> situation, this can only take place to extent climate improves in<br />

regard to King, and even then we must act only with closest agreement<br />

3 In telegram 3758 from Athens, July 13, Tasca reported that during a July 11 meeting<br />

with Papadopoulos, the two men discussed the future <strong>of</strong> the monarchy. The Greek<br />

Prime Minister expressed strong personal dislike for King Constantine but stressed his<br />

own monarchism. Tasca concluded that abdication might be the regime’s answer and<br />

that “Prime Minister’s almost totally negative attitude on King may reflect belief that at<br />

this point King is mainly Trojan Horse for regime opponents.” (Ibid.)

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