Greece - US Department of State

628 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
they need to play an honorable and effective role in the defense of their
national territory is an indispensable part of this aim. One of the critical
aspects of the MAP withholding policy has indeed been its implicit
affront to Greek military pride. If handled discriminatingly, this tactic
can be effective, up to a point, but if carried too far, without really convincing
justification, it could end by being seriously counterproductive.
You know the arguments the Greek military put forward: “You
Americans obviously fear the Russians as do we, so why do you cut
off our weapons?”, or the invidious conclusion: “Your actions clearly
reveal that you do not consider the Greek officer corps sufficiently trustworthy
to refrain from using these weapons against their own people.”
In addition, permitting the Greek military establishment to fall notably
behind that of Turkey could have highly undesirable repercussions by
prejudicing the current painstaking effort to improve Greek-Turkish
relations.
We therefore believe that an important adjunct to the foregoing
tactic would be to make clear to the Greek military leadership, as distinct
from Papadopoulos & Co., that whereas we are restoring our arms
deliveries in recognition of the value of Greece’s NATO role, this action
has considerably strained domestic political tolerances in the
United States and does not at all signify uncritical acceptance of the
GOG’s internal policies. The Greek military should be informed that
we will accordingly continue to press for a return to constitutional government.
Here one could adopt the line that the failure of Greece to return
to democratic practices increases the prospect of internal political
instability which, in turn, tends to make Greece a less reliable strategic
ally of the U.S. and in NATO. While we shall obviously have to be
very careful in any such attempt to drive a wedge, however subtly, between
the Greek armed forces and the “Colonels,” it should undoubtedly
be considered as a possible policy instrument.
In support of the psychological aspects of a policy of restoring the
MAP and disassociating it from political performance, I have always
felt, as you know, Dan (without, I’ll admit, any very profound insight
into the Greek psyche), that one is on firmer psychological grounds
with a Greek in manifesting friendship and trust toward him than in
treating him in a manner which casts doubt on his personal reliability.
This is doubtless part of the old, if overused, business of “philotimo.” 8
Having given concrete evidence of such confidence, it seems to me that
one is then in a stronger position to criticize, with some expectation
that the Greek will listen to, and possibly even accept such advice. At
least the chances of his resenting it would appear to be less. I suspect,
on the other hand, that the Greek also responds to the Middle Eastern
8 Dignity, self-esteem, or sense of honor. Literally “love of honor.”