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Greece - US Department of State

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<strong>Greece</strong> 791<br />

The Arab World and Africa<br />

25. Impelled by such factors as the need to broaden diplomatic<br />

support for <strong>Greece</strong> and concern for Greeks living abroad, the junta has<br />

made efforts during the past two years to improve its standing with<br />

Arab and sub-Sahara African governments. <strong>Greece</strong> has entered a supply<br />

and training agreement with the Libyan Air Force and has exchanged<br />

high-level visits with several West African countries.<br />

III. Prospects and Contingencies<br />

26. In more than four years <strong>of</strong> power, the leaders have shown themselves<br />

adept in maintaining their control. Their prospects for continuing<br />

to do so now appear good. Such factors as their own cohesiveness,<br />

a passive populace, a contented army, an efficient police, no strong foreign<br />

pressures for change, and a booming economy all point towards<br />

their continued survival. But any <strong>of</strong> these and other favorable ones could<br />

change unexpectedly, bringing on a new situation. Some combination<br />

<strong>of</strong> internal failures, outside developments, and foreign pressures could<br />

cause serious trouble for the leadership; it is even conceivable that the<br />

entire military regime might be ousted altogether. For example:<br />

a. The cohesiveness that has characterized the military leadership<br />

since the 1967 coup could erode in time or fracture suddenly over some<br />

major issue. In such circumstances Papadopoulos might be replaced<br />

by another member <strong>of</strong> the junta or by another secret army clique; or<br />

the present system might give way to some form <strong>of</strong> “collective” leadership<br />

with no single individual exercising much influence over events.<br />

b. If over time resistance groups in exile and the traditional party<br />

politicians now inactive were able to coordinate their efforts and organize<br />

popular support, they might pose a threat to the junta, encourage<br />

divisions between it and the armed forces, or at least constitute a<br />

source <strong>of</strong> serious harassment, possibly by terrorist tactics.<br />

c. The Greek economy and political system will remain heavily<br />

dependent on developments taking place outside the country or over<br />

which its government has no control. For example, a serious setback<br />

in a conflict with the Turks over Cyprus could lead to the junta’s downfall.<br />

A serious recession in Europe would sharply reduce worker remittances<br />

from West Germany, cut tourist revenues, contract a principal<br />

market for exports, and bring on depressed economic conditions<br />

in <strong>Greece</strong>, with consequent trouble for its rulers.<br />

d. In addition, the regime—already an international pariah in the<br />

eyes <strong>of</strong> some groups and smaller countries in Europe—would be vulnerable<br />

were it to face concerted opposition from the principal European<br />

powers. It would be very much more so were it to encounter active<br />

hostility from the <strong>US</strong> Government as well. In such circumstances<br />

the junta’s survival could be seriously threatened.

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