Greece - US Department of State

Greece 651
Mr. Rockwell thought that the regime would not be shaken to any
real degree by the Karamanlis statement and General Unger noted that
the possibility of a military takeover was considered in about the fourth
order of probability.
Mr. Rockwell thought Karamanlis’ statement would have most effect
on the older members of the army who were fairly well isolated
in any event. He commented that one reason for Karamanlis’ action is
the fear of the erosion of his own position as the regime becomes more
entrenched.
Mr. Kissinger commented that Karamanlis’ natural appeal is not
to the army.
Mr. Rockwell noted there was some discontent in the army but it
was not a major issue.
Mr. Kissinger asked how we would go about implementing Option
2.
Mr. Rockwell thought this would depend a great deal on the relationship
which our new Ambassador would be able to establish with
the Prime Minister and the government. He thought they might cooperate
with a view to easing the problems step by step.
Mr. Kissinger asked if the Greek government could afford to admit
that they were changing their policies under U.S. pressure.
Mr. Rockwell replied that the government was already committed
to return to constitutional government but they were in fact not meeting
their stated timetable. He thought the success of Option 2 would
depend on the powers of persuasion of our Ambassador.
Mr. Kissinger asked, “and if he does not succeed?”
Mr. Rockwell replied we would then have to decide whether to
continue to withhold or release the suspended items.
Mr. Cargo asked if, once we had made the pitch, the Greeks do
not respond, can we in fact resume deliveries?
Mr. Rockwell thought that if, indeed, the effort is a failure there
would still be no reason why we could not release the equipment.
Mr. Kissinger asked if we would then be going through the option
2 exercise to quiet American domestic opinion.
Mr. Rockwell said we would be attempting to use the leverage we
had to bring about advantageous political change.
Mr. Kissinger said that if, in fact, aid is given in U.S. security interests,
and the result of option 2 would be no aid, we would be hurting
ourselves.
Mr. Rockwell thought we might be postponing delivery of aid but
it would probably eventually go, depending on the Ambassador’s view
at the time.