Greece - US Department of State

710 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
with its program to implement the constitution and return Greece to a
more representative form of government. He also doubts that progress
towards representative democracy will be sufficiently dramatic or
rapid to satisfy fully Greece’s vocal critics here and abroad. Only the
fixing of a date for elections would suit them.
Developments in Greece Since November
The Greek Government has taken some positive steps in the direction
of the restoration of civil liberties. But the Greek Government has
only a very primitive understanding of what it must do to improve its
image in Western Europe. It tends to announce measures which would
earn it credit at precisely the moment when it is attracting hostile criticism
to itself for its arbitrary behavior in suppressing political opposition.
We agree with Ambassador Tasca that the Greek Government does
indeed intend to move forward with its program to return Greece to a
more representative form of government, though its progress so far is
slow and the record is spotty. This conviction is not shared by some of
Greece’s NATO partners (chiefly the Norwegians, Danes and Dutch)
nor, broadly, by certain elements in the Congress, some of whom show
intense concern on this question. These critics assert that the Greek
Government has retrogressed instead of making progress toward constitutionalism
and that the United States (and NATO) should disassociate
itself from a regime which has earned so much moral obloquy.
The NATO Problem
Public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in United
States military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity and the
NATO image, regardless of how the matter is handled tactically.
If the Greek question were to be highlighted by a United States
decision to resume heavy military shipments to Greece before the
NATO Ministerial Meetings of May 26–27 and June 11, it is very probable
that one of the Western European countries, probably one of the
Scandinavians with the support of some of the others, would attempt
to raise the Greek question, arguing that the question of military assistance
to Greece is basically political in nature and that it is not possible
to ignore public opinion in their countries on the issue. Even if
the Greek question itself did not come before NATO, indirect attacks
on Greece could harmfully dominate these two meetings and effectively
prevent progress on other matters.
Public opinion in Western Europe generally with respect to Greece
has not improved in recent months; and there is already mounting political
pressure upon some NATO governments (Norway, Denmark,
The Netherlands) to raise the question of Greece in NATO, alleging
that the undemocratic nature of the regime is a matter of concern to
the Alliance. Together with the British, Germans and Italians we have