Greece - US Department of State

650 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
replied ‘yes’ except for Mr. Shakespeare who thought the paper did not
state clearly enough the potential danger to U.S. interests in the
Mediterranean.
General Unger submitted an additional paragraph for insertion on
page 2 of the paper immediately preceding the paragraph headed “Security
Interests,” which gave more emphasis to this point.
Mr. Kissinger asked if the major argument for continuing present
policy is that it gives us a lever on the existing government.
Mr. Rockwell agreed, saying also this was less painful to NATO.
It was, however, opposed by some of the more vociferous members of
the Congress and by Greek opponents of the regime.
Mr. Kissinger asked if there wasn’t a risk that we would wind up
by alienating everyone. That if we give them a substantial amount of
military aid the opposition would protest while the Junta would consider
we were discriminating against them.
Mr. Rockwell admitted that if we turn on the supply of tanks and
heavy equipment it would be considered a sign of approval of the
Greek government; however, he thought our security interests outweighed
this disadvantage.
Mr. Cargo noted that the NATO problem was not too serious.
NATO attitudes would not result in less support for Greece since
the other NATO countries did not give assistance to Greece in any
event.
General Unger commented that the NATO countries think Greece
is a greater advantage to the U.S. than it is to NATO. He thought they
looked on Greek and Turkish accession to NATO as a U.S. gift.
Mr. Shakespeare asked what the effect of Karamanlis’ recent statement
would be. 7
Mr. Rockwell said that we would have to wait to see what the political
influence would be of Karamanlis’ call on the military to overthrow
the present government, particularly if the King should join
such a move. He noted that the government has banned publication of
Karamanlis’ statement and that the Prime Minister has called a press
conference.
Mr. Shakespeare noted that the VOA would have to cover the Karamanlis
story if its credibility were not to be completely shot in Greece.
Mr. Kissinger asked if this could be done on a one-shot basis, and
Mr. Shakespeare replied that it could.
7 On September 30 Karamanlis issued a statement calling for the overthrow of the
junta and expressed his willingness to head an interim government. For text, see Greece
Under the Junta, pp. 116–118.