Greece - US Department of State

688 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX
but that his room for maneuver depends on his ability to cope with his
less politically minded colleagues—some of whom carry guns. His future
may well be influenced by factors beyond his control. I believe
this is what he meant when he told me that he must pass through a
mine field in his progress toward implementing the Constitution.
6. In sum, our best current information is that the tenure of the
present regime is not likely to be seriously challenged inside Greece
for some years. Every ambassadorial colleague I have spoken with
shares this view. American interests would seem to be best served by
encouraging Papadopoulos to implement the 1968 Constitution as rapidly
as possible, and by using our influence to strengthen his hand
against any opposition to that course from among his revolutionary
colleagues.
Tasca
270. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Ambassador to Greece
(Tasca) 1
Washington, March 4, 1970.
Dear Henry:
I have read your letter of February 27th with great interest. 2
Let me try to state very simply my understanding of the mandate,
and what is expected back here.
I understood the NSC decision of November 14, 1969 (NSDM 34) 3
to mean that it was decided, in principle, that we were prepared to lift
the suspension of arms shipments. This decision to resume shipments
was not conditioned on concrete steps by the Greek Government in the
direction of constitutional democracy. But you were to make clear to
the Government that movement toward a constitutional situation
would ease U.S. problems in speeding the release of the suspended
1 Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, U.S. Policy Towards
Greece. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only; Official–Informal.
2 Attached but not printed. In it Tasca recounted a conversation with Shakespeare
and requested clarification regarding the implementation of the policy outlined in NSDM
34.
3 Document 262.